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MARICOPA COUNTY AND THE PROBLEM
OF PER SE CHARACTERIZATION IN
HORIZONTAL PRICE FIXING CASES
I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence and development of economics as a science' over the
past century and an accompanying increase in the complexity and use
of economic theory2 has greatly complicated the judiciary's task of utilizing
traditional legal analysis in resolving antitrust litigation.' However, the
development of complex economic analysis is not the only factor con-
tributing to the existing confusion and uncertainty in antitrust law. A
general lack of agreement regarding the goals of antitrust law in general4
1. "Economics... 2. The Science relating to the production and distribution
of material wealth..." THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3rd ed. 1969).
2. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST, S1, at 1-2 (1977).
3. See Flynn, Introduction-Antitrust Jurisprudence: A Symposium on the
Economic Political and Social Goals of Antitrust Policy, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1182 (1977).
See also L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, 551,2. A casual glance through any Journal of Law
& Economics issue will convince even the greatest skeptic that the judiciary's task
in comprehending available economic data is not an envious one. See, e.g., McGee,
Predatory Price Fixing Revisited, 23 J. LAW & ECON. 289 (1980).
4. Compare Bork & Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COL. L. REV. 363
(1965) (antitrust policy concerned with efficient resource allocation) with Blake & Jones,
Toward a Three Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 65 COL. L. REV 377 (1965) (antitrust policy
has political as well as economic goals). See also R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 1-11,
408-25 (1977). But see Brietzke, Book Review, 13 VAL. L. REV. 403 (1979). "You will .
• .love [THE ANTITRUST PARADOX] if Bork's prejudices confirm your own. If they don't,
you-like this reviewer-will undoubtedly remain unmoved .. " Id. at 405.
At present, there are two predominant and somewhat antagonistic approaches
to antitrust law and analysis; they are popularly known as the "Chicago School" and
the "Harvard School." Each "school" advocates its own form of antitrust ideology.
Although other "schools" do exist, and although there is a broad range of principles
and theories represented within both the Harvard and Chicago schools, this note will
focus on the latter two "schools" and treat each as a homogenous body espousing
singular principles.
Briefly, adherents to "Chicago School" analysis posit that the sole goal of anti-
trust policy is the promotion of "consumer welfare." See R. BORK, supra, 3-8, 50-66.
Consumer welfare, in turn, is promoted by increasing a market's resource allocation
efficiency (making what the consumer wants) and its productive efficiency (using the
least amount of resources). The promotion of these economic efficiencies thereby reduces
resource misallocation due to monopoly power. Thus, the maximization of consumer
welfare is the one and only standard to be used in evaluating alleged restraints of trade.
Proponents of "Harvard School" analysis recognize the value and worth of
economic analysis but do not believe that maximization of consumer welfare should
be the sole goal of antitrust law. See, e.g., Blake & Jones, In Defense of Antitrust,
65 COL L. REV. 377, 381-82 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Blake & Jones, Defense]. "Harvard"
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and of the Sherman Act' in particular6 is yet another factor contributing
to the current crisis in antitrust.
The legal process' limited capability to adjudicate disputes
through the use of economic analysis causes inconsistency in case law
and doctrinal ambiguity in antitrust law.' Since courts employ tradi-
tional tools of legal analysis to formulate antitrust doctrine,' judges
now find themselves required to resolve complex and diverse factual
issues' by reference to fairly inflexible, generalized and simplified rules
adherents emphasize the populist origins of American antitrust law and advocate that
this populist tradition sometimes requires that social policy-oriented goals take
precedence over the economically-oriented goal of maximizing consumer welfare. These
goals include the decentralization of economic power, the optimization of individual
entrepreneural freedom and opportunity, and a social preference for the smaller com-
petitor. Generally, proponents of "Harvard" analysis favor more strenuous enforce-
ment of antitrust statutes than their "Chicago" colleagues because such a policy fur-
thers the goals enumerated above.
For further discussion and elucidation of the "Chicago School" of antitrust
ideology, see generally R. BORK, supra; R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVE (1976); G. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY (1968). For a description
of "Harvard School" ideology and analysis, see L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, SS1,2; Blake
& Jones, Defense, supra, at 377-400.
5. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, S1, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. §1
(1976). The pertinent provision of the statute reads: "Every contract, combination
or conspiracy in restraint of trade . . . is hereby declared to be illegal." Id.
6. Compare Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.
LAW & ECON. 7 (1966) (Sherman Act enacted to promote maximization of consumer wealth)
with Sullivan, Economic and More Humanistic Disciplines: What are the Sources of
Wisdom for Antitrust?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1214, 1218 (1977) (Congressional purpose in
enacting Sherman Act both vaguer and broader than Chicago analysts would allow).
For a thorough discussion of the Sherman Act's legislative history and policy
goals, see W. LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE
SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT(1981); H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY (1955); Bork,
supra.
7. The effectiveness of traditional legal analysis depends on the validity of
general, broadly construed principles and rules, and well defined factual settings which
permit consistency and predictibility in the application of those principles and rules.
L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, S1, at 7. Antitrust litigation, which involves less determinate
factual issues and emphasizes economic theory, is more difficult to fit within the tradi-
tional legal analysis. Id. See also infra note 8.
8. Courts have long recognized that the Sherman Act cannot literally mean
what it says. See infra note 36 and accompanying text. Since the Sherman Act cannot
be interpreted literally, and because the statute provides little substantive guidance,
judges use the legal process's analytical tools of characterization, rulemaking, and rule
application (adjudication) to resolve the many economically-oriented factual disputes
before them. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, S1, at 7.
9. Common factual issues arising in the course of litigation are actual percen-
tage of market power and a defendant firm's marginal cost.
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which the legal process has a penchant for creating."0 The incongruity
of legal and economic methodologies has resulted in tremendous costs,
both in terms of litigation expenses and judicial economy."
Horizontal" price fixing 3 cases illustrate the difficulty of apply-
ing economic theory through the use of legal analytical tools such as
10. Professor Flynn summarized the judiciary's formidible task:
[Tihe Court is charged with giving effect to the long term value choices
underlying the vague and general language of... [antitrust] law, all the
while respecting the effective limits of the judicial process and balancing
the need for a generous flexibility to accommodate new circumstances
and certainty to resolve present and pressing problems.
Flynn, supra note 3, at 1188.
11. Consider, for instance, the government's recently settled antitrust action
against IBM. As of 1976, the Justice Department had spent approximately $5 million
on the case. An earlier suit against IBM by Control Data Corp., which spawned the
latter's now impressive computer litigation service, involved discovery of over 30 million
documents. 11 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 387, 390 n. 9 (1978). See also Arizona v. Maricopa Coun-
ty Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (1982).
12. While any unreasonable restraint of trade is forbidden under the Sher-
man Act, such a restraint is usually classified by the structure of the market it affects.
Those restraints which restrain competition among firms at the same market level (of
production, distribution, etc.) are horizontal restraints. Price fixing among competing
firms is an example of such a restraint.
Restraints linking two different market levels in the same chain of manufacture
and distribution are vertical restraints. A manufacturer's ownership of retail outlets,
such as a television manufacturer's ownership of the stores in which its product is
sold, is a typical vertical market structure. Should that manufacturer prohibit the televi-
sion retailer from selling the former's televisions at any location other than the store
the latter now manages, this prohibition would be a vertical restraint of trade. See
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 8433 U.S. 36 (1977) (vertical territorial restraint
imposed upon television retailer by television manufacturer not illegal per se).
13. Were "price fixing" a term readily subject to definition there would be
no need to author this note, which analyzes that process by which courts determine
whether a given agreement or activity constitutes "price fixing." The process by which
courts characterize agreements or conduct as per se illegal "price fixes" is known as
"per se characterization" analysis. For a discussion as to the meaning and significance
of a finding of "per se illegality," see infra note 16. See also infra note 20.
While there is no authoritative definition of "price fixing" in existence, the
Court has consistently declared as "price fixes" those agreements in which competitors
directly set the price level at which their products will sell. Such agreements are
characterized as "horizontal price fixes." See supra note 12. The Court has long held
this type of agreement to be a violation of §1 of the Sherman Act. See, e.g., United
States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), affd., 175 U.S. 211
(1899) (agreement among six leading producers of iron pipe, which divided nation into
territories and established fixed prices for each, declared illegal as violating Sherman
Act); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n., 166 U.S. 290 (1897) (one of the first Supreme
Court antitrust cases-agreement among railroads to set standard freight schedule
declared an illegal restraint of trade violating §1 of the Sherman Act).
"Vertical price restraints" exist as well. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S.
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rule application, the syllogism, and characterization.14 Judges are often
urged to characterize a contested agreement as a "price fix," a
characterization which results in the agreement usually" being
declared illegal per se. 6 Unfortunately, neither the Supreme Court
nor lower federal courts have been able to adopt and maintain a per
se characterization standard which can be consistently and effectively
applied in horizontal price fixing cases. 8
145 (1968); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
The Albrecht and Kiefer-Stewart decisions were discussed at length in Maricopa County.
See Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2474-75. See also infra note 70.
14. One commentator has effectively documented the lack of a uniform method
for analyzing price fixing cases. Allison, Ambiguous Price Fixing & The Sherman Act:
Simplistic Labels or Unavoidable Analysis? 16 Hous. L. REv. 761 (1979).
15. Until recently, all "price fixes" were thought to be illegal per se in accor-
dance with the Court's landmark decision in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150 (1940). However, in a recent decision, the Court declared that "not all
agreements impact[ing] on price are per se violations of the Sherman Act or even
unreasonable restraints." Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441
U.S. 1, 23 (1979). Thus, there is still some uncertainty as to whether all price fixes
are illegal per se. However, as this note will discuss, the Court's most recent pro-
nouncement on this subject appears to have substantially overruled the Court's dicta
in Broadcast Music. See Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2479-80, 2482-85. See also
infra notes 269-81 and accompanying text.
16. In the ninety-plus years since the Sherman Act's enactment, the Court has
found through judicial experience that certain types of agreements warrant a con-
clusive presumption of illegality because of "their pernicious effect on competition and
lack of any redeeming virtues." Northern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5
(1958) (the "classic" treatment of per se illegality). See also United States v. Container
Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 341 (1969) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Maricopa County, 102
S. Ct. at 2473. The Court has found several categories of conduct, including price fix-
ing, to be so inherently anticompetitive as to constitute unreasonable restraints of
trade. United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392, 398 (1927).
Plaintiffs frequently seek a per se labeling because the accompanying conclusive
presumption of illegality prevents a defendant from supplying any justification for
his actions: a plaintiff need merely show that proscribed per se conduct, such as a
price fix, has occurred, and liability is automatically imposed upon the defendant. cf.
Maricopa County 102 S. Ct. at 2473 (once Court can predict with confidence that par-
ticular type of restraint is unreasonable, it will use per se rule to make conclusive
presumption of illegality). But cf supra note 15. Thus, the per se rule is said to have
a "preclusionary effect" by precluding defendants from making procompetitive justifica-
tions for their conduct. See, e.g., Taylor, Rule of Reason Cases Since National Society
of Professional Engineers, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 185 (1982).
Courts have found four practices to be per se unlawful under §1 of the Sher-
man Act: price-fixing, Trenton Potteries 273 U.S. 392; division of markets, United States
v. Topco Assoc's., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); group boycotts, Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway
Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); and tying arrangements, Northern Pac. R.R.,
356 U.S. at 5.
17. See supra note 13. See also infra note 20.
18. In describing and explaining the sometimes arbitrary analysis courts use
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 4 [1984], Art. 5
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The Court's most recent pronouncement in the per se price-fixing
area is Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society. 9 The Court in
Maricopa County radically altered the per se standard" to be applied
in conducting a per se characterization analysis in price fixing cases.2'
Prior to Maricopa County, in Broadcast Music Inc. v. Columbia Broad-
casting System,2" the Court had constructed a per se standard which
in characterizing agreements as per se illegal price fixes, one writer has noted that:
"Factualfindings... sometimes appear to have been made by the court[s] solely from
a vague sense of obligation, with no real nexus having been established between the
findings and the ultimate conclusion. Not surprisingly, intuition seems to play an
especially major role in such cases." Allison, supra note 14, at 768.
19. 102 S. Ct. 2466. In Maricopa County, the state of Arizona alleged that physi-
cians in Maricopa County had violated the Sherman Act by forming a Foundation for
Medical Care (FMC). This foundation's key function was to create and submit a fee
schedule for approval by majority vote of the foundation's physician-members. Id. at
2469. This fee schedule established maximum fees which foundation members could
charge patients insured under a foundation-sponsored health plan. Id. at 2480. The
foundation invited insurance companies to participate in the foundation program by
offering health insurance policies based on the fixed fee schedule. Id. at 2480-81.
The FMC argued that its fee schedule had saved consumers millions of dollars
by allowing insurers to more efficiently underwrite medical insurance policies. Id. at
2472, 2481. The state argued that the creation of a fee schedule establishing maximum
price levels was a direct and per se illegal "price fix" among competitors (foundation
members). Id. at 2469. For further discussion of the case, see infra notes 222-50 and
accompanying text.
20. This note distinguishes between a per se standard and the per se characteriza-
tion process. A per se standard is a test or set of criteria which courts use in weighing
various pro- and anticompetitive factors raised by antitrust litigants in regards to the
propriety (or lack thereof) of a per se finding. Some of these factors include tampering
with price competition, greater (or lesser) economic efficiency, and higher (or lower)
transaction costs. The per se characterization process, described supra note 13, involves
a court's applying a particular per se standard to a given case and subsequently reaching
a conclusion as to whether per se illegality should be found.
21. See Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
22. 441 U.S. 1 (1979). In Broadcast Music competing composers allowed the
American Society of Authors, Composers and Publishers (ASCAP) and Broadcast Music,
fnc. (BMI) to issue licenses giving users the right to perform any products of a given
composer. In practice, ASCAP and BMI issued blanket licenses to networks and other
users of compositions, which allowed the users to perform any of the millions of com-
positions in the organizations' repertoire. Id. at 5. CBS charged that the blanket license
itself was illegal per se because it reduced competition among composers by reducing
their incentive to bargain individually with users of their products. Id. at 6.
The Court refused to characterize the blanket licenses as illegal per se because,
inter alia, they reduced the inherently high transaction costs involved in the music
market. Id. at 20-22. Without the blanket licenses, costs to users of negotiating with
individual copyright owners every time the former desired to perform the latter's
composition would be prohibitive. Likewise, the costs to copyright owners in enforc-
ing their statutory rights against unauthorized users of their works would be pro-
hibitive. Id. The Court reasoned that the blanket licenses proved beneficial to both
De Grasse: Maricopa County and the Problem of Per Se Characterization in Hor
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incorporated concepts of economic efficiency and maximization of con-
sumer wealth.' Many Court observers and several Justices interpreted
Broadcast Music as allowing agreements which exhibited the poten-
tial for creating substantial and otherwise unattainable economic effi-
ciencies to escape per se illegality, even if such agreements literally
fixed a price.24
However, in Maricopa County, the Court characterized an agree-
ment purportedly creating substantial economic efficiencies as a per
se illegal "price fix."25 The Court declared in dicta that all agreements
directly or indirectly tampering with price or price structure were
illegal per se." A comparison of the Court's holdings in Broadcast Music
and Maricopa County reveals obvious inconsistencies which cannot be
explained by distinguishing the two cases on their facts.27 The Court's
apparent abandonment of Broadcast Music's per se standard and its
reinstatement of a previously discarded standard28 will undoubtedly
generate an enormous amount of confusion regarding the proper scope
and application of the per se price fixing standard.
This note examines the various per se price fixing standards for-
mulated by the Court since the Sherman Act's inception and traces
the development of the per se characterization process used in horizon-
tal price fixing cases. The discussion concentrates on the Court's
holdings in Continental Television Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,29 National
buyers and sellers and thus created substantial economic efficiencies by reducing these
high transaction costs. Id. at 19-20. See infra notes 156-204 and accompanying text.
23. See supra note 4.
24. See Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2482 (Powell, J., dissenting); ANTITRUST
ADVISOR, 2D ED: 1982 CUMULATIVE SUPP. §1.29 at 13, 22 (1982) (prepared by Prof. Wesley
Liebeler of the UCLA Law School) [hereinafter cited to as ANTITRUST ADVISOR].
25. See Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2475, 2477, 2480. The fixing of maximum
fees purportedly saved consumers millions of dollars by enabling insurers to calculate
more efficiently the risks they underwrote. Id. at 2472, 2481-82. See also supra note
19. In Broadcast Music ASCAP's & BMI's creation of a blanket license, which offered
compositions to users at annual or per-program rates, greatly reduced the market's
high transaction costs. Broadcast Music 441 U.S. at 20-22. See also supra note 22.
26. See Maricopa County 102 S. Ct. at 2472-78.
27. "The Court's effort to distinguish Broadcast Music is .. . unconvincing."
Maricopa County 102 S. Ct. at 2484 (Powell, J., dissenting). See alsp infra note 281
and accompanying text; ANTIRRUST ADVISOR. supra note 24, S1.29, at 21-23.
28. Broadcast Music was thought to have tacitly overruled in part the Court's
holding in Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. 150. See ANTITRUST ADVISOR supra note 24, S1.29. See
also infra note 194 and accompanying text. Maricopa County appears to have revitalized
Socony-Vacuum's holding. See Maricopa County 102 S. Ct. at 2474-75. See also infra notes
263-67 and accompanying text. Note that the Broadcast Music per se standard existed for
only two years before its apparent demise.
29. 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (vertical territorial restraint held not to be illegal per se).
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Society of Professional Engineers v. United States," Broadcast Music"
and Maricopa County.2 The latter case's flaws, implications and like-
ly effect on existing case law are also examined. The distressing con-
clusion reached is that Maricopa County will further mire the Court
in the "analytical swamp"33 of per se characterization analysis.
Justice Stevens attempted to resolve existing conflicts and uncer-
tainty in the per se process through his Maricopa County majority
opinion. Unfortunately, he only heightened confusion and inconsistency
in this area of the law through his questionable application of a rule
which, ironically, was created to enhance certainty and litigational
efficiency in antitrust law.34 However, the informed antitrust observer
will not be too critical of the Justice since confusion and uncertainty
have been the trademarks of the per se price fixing rule since its
inception seventy-three years ago.3 5 Thus, before one can intelligently
criticize the majority's position in Maricopa County, he or she must
gain an appreciation of the difficulties and dilemmas which all judges
face when applying a per se characterization standard. A brief review
of the case law out of which the per se rule evolved is therefore in
order.
II. THE CREATION AND EVOLUTION
OF PER SE CHARACTERIZATION IN THE
HORIZONTAL PRICE FIXING CONTEXT
A. The Rule of Reason
Courts have not interpreted the Sherman Act as prohibiting all
contracts restraining trade, even though the Act liberally bars all such
contracts. 6 Instead, the Supreme Court has honored the common law
30. 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (professional society's ethical canon prohibiting competitive
bidding for members' services is a "price fix" and so is illegal per se).
31. 431 U.S. 1 (1979).
32. 102 S. Ct. 2466 (1982).
33. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, §72, at 197.
34. See Maricopa County 102 S. Ct. at 2473; Container Corp. 393 U.S. at 341
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Northern Pac. R.R., 356 U.S. at 5. See also infra notes 48-52
and accompanying text.
35. Most observers agree that the per se rule had its origin in the Standard
Oil of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). See, e.g., Maricopa County 102
S. Ct. at 2473 (Court announced per se rule by establishing conclusive presumption
of illegality in some instances); L. SULLIVAN supra note 2, S65, at 174 (Standard Oil
accepts embroyonic per se rule).
36. As the Court noted in Professional Eng'rs "[Rlestraint is the very essence
of every contract; read literally, §1 would outlaw the entire body of contract law."
435 U.S. at 687. Justice Stevens also quoted Justice Brandeis' now-famous phrase: "Every
19841 1013
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concept of "unreasonable restraints""7 and has prohibited only those
agreements which unreasonably or unduly restrain trade." Courts
gauge such "reasonableness" by applying the controlling standard of
"competition"; only those agreements found to significantly restrain
competition are declared illegal."a
Courts analyze an agreement's purpose and effect to determine
if competition has been significantly altered.4 If a court finds that
an agreement's sole purpose is to restrain competition an anti-
agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain,
is of their very essence." Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
37. Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
38. See Professional Eng'rs 435 U.S. at 688-90, where the Court traced the
origins of the Rule of Reason to Mitchell v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep.
347 (K.B. 1711), and thereafter noted the Standard Oil Court's use of a similar "reason"
analysis. The pertinent portion of Mitchell reads as follows:
[APiI contracts, where there is a bare restraint of trade, and no more,
must be void; but this taking place only where the consideration is not
shown can be no reason why, in cases where the special matter appears
so as to make it a reasonable and useful contact, it should not be good....
P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. at 351.
Standard Oil was the first Supreme Court case to use the "unreasonable" and
"undue" restraint of trade language. 221 U.S. 60. This language has been used in a
countless number of cases since then. See, e.g., Professional Eng'rs 435 U.S. 679; United
States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522 (1948); Chicago Bd. of Trade 246 U.S.
231. See generally L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, S 64, 68.
39. The Court in Standard Oil for the first time explicitly used a "competi-
tion" standard to evaluate reasonableness: "lIlt may be with accuracy said that the
dread of enhancement of prices and of other wrongs which it was thought would flow
from the undue limitation on competitive conditions . . . led . . . to the prohibition
... [of] all contracts or acts which were unreasonably restrictive of competitive condi-
tions...." 221 U.S. at 58. See also L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, § 65, 66.
40. See, e.g., Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. at 525; United States v. American
Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911). See also R. BORK, supra note 4, at 36-37; L.
SULLIVAN supra note 2, SS 68, 71; Allison, supra note 14, at 766-70.
Judge (later Chief Justice) Taft combined common law doctrine with his own
concept of antitrust law's proper scope to create an analytical "purpose or effect" device
by which courts could effectively gauge the overall reasonableness (and hence legality)
of a given act. United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898),
aff'd., 175 U.S. 211 (1899). Taft held that all restraints on competition were unlawful
unless they: (1) were ancillary to the contract's (act's) main purpose; (2) were necessary
to protect the promisee in employment of the contract's fruits; and (3) did not contain
restraints exceeding those necessary to protect the promisee's employment of the con-
tract. Id. at 282.
Courts have interpreted Taft's holding as requiring application of the Rule of
Reason to all restraints which are ancillary to a legitimate purpose so as to determine
whether the procompetitive benefits of such a restraint outweigh the anticompetitive
harms. See, e.g., Professional Eng'rs 435 U.S. at 689. Addyston Pipe is thereby con-
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 4 [1984], Art. 5
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competitive effect is conclusively presumed. Consequently, the agree-
ment will be declared illegal regardless of its actual effect on
sidered to mandate a determination of both purpose (legitimate vs. illegitimate) and
competitive effect (pro- or anticompetitive).
Judge Bork has interpreted Addyston Pipe as validating combinations which
exhibit no purpose to restrict output while simultaneously creating economic efficien-
cies (lower prices, higher quality product) through an integration of the competing
firms' productive resources in which price fixing, is merely an ancillary restraint. See
R. BORK supra note 4, at 26-30, 263-75. Judge Bork defines an ancillary restraint as a
restraint that is subordinate and collateral to a legitimate purpose and which also
increases economic efficiency. Id. at 27. One effect of the judge's interpretation is to
legalize those combinations in which a price fix is subordinate and collateral to the
legitimate purpose of integrating firms' productive activities in order to enhance group
members' economic efficiency. Id.
According to Judge Bork, such combinations are justified because the increase
in economic efficiencies ultimately benefits consumers, thereby satisfying antitrust law's
sole goal of maximizing consumer welfare. See supra note 4. Thus, a combination can
actually suppress "competition" (defined by Judge Bork as "rivalry") and still be legal
as long as productive efficiency is increased through the elimination of that competi-
tion by contract integration (integrations between independently owned rivals), or owner-
ship integration (integration including the fusing of ownership, e.g., horizontal mergers).
See R. Bork, supra note 4, at 279.
Judge Bork summarizes his theory by proposing a three-step model:
The upshot is that when the integration is essential if the .activi-
ty is to be carried on at all, the integration and restraints that make
it efficient should be completely lawful. But when the integration may
be useful but is not essential (in the sense that cooperation is not the
essence of the activity), then the joint venture and its ancillary restraints
(including price fixing) ... should be lawful when three conditions are met:
(1) The agreement fixing prices or dividing markets is ancillary to a con-
tract integration; that is, the parties must be cooperating in an economic
activity other than the elimination of rivalry, and the agreement must
be capable of increasing the effectiveness of that cooperation and no
broader than necessary for that purpose.(2) The collective market share
of the parties does not make the restriction of output a realistic danger
(judged by rational horizontal merger standards).(3) The parties must not
have demonstrated a primary purpose or intent to restrict output.
Where any one of these conditions is not met, the horizontal agree-
ment should be unlawful. Where there is no coordination of productive
activities, the first condition is violated; such an agreement is naked rather
than ancillary and should be illegal per se.
Id
Judge Bork's analysis is given extended attention here because it alters the
per se characterization process (see supra note 20) to a great degree. Under the judge's
analytical approach, agreements which tamper or suppress price competition would
escape characterization as "horizontal price fixes" (which are illegal per se) provided
these restraints were ancillary to a contract integration and increased productive effi-
ciency. Id. However, under Socony-Vacuum's description of the characterization process,
such agreements would be characterized as per se illegal "price fixes" because they
had the effect of "raising, depressing, fixing, pegging or stabilizing ... [a commodity's]
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competition." However, if an anticompetitive purpose cannot be
discerned, the court identifies the agreement's harmful and beneficial
effects on competition. After identifying these pro- and anticompetitive
effects, the court balances these effects to determine whether the
agreement produces a net anti- or procompetitive effect.42 If the court
finds that an agreement's anticompetitive harm outweighs its pro-
competitive benefit, the agreement is classified as an unreasonable
restraint of trade violating S 1 of the Sherman Act.43 Alternatively,
if the court finds that the agreement produces a net procompetitive
effect, no 1 violation is found. This "purpose or effect" analysis is
known as the "Rule of Reason"" and has been applied by courts since
shortly after the Sherman Act's inception.
price." Socony-Vacuum 310 U.S. at 223. See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
The distinction between these two conflicting approaches to per se characteriza-
tion lies at the heart of the current "per se price fixing" characterization debate. See
infra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
41. One commentator succinctly summarized the rationale behind presuming
effect solely on the basis of a proven purpose to restrict competition:
Denunciation of conduct solely on the basis of predominant
anticompetitive intent is entirely consonant with the rule of reason's con-
cern for competitive impact. The combination's participants are probably
the best judges of the feasibility of their scheme; they ordinarily would
not undertake a plan to limit or to stifle competition without having a
reasonably high probability of success. Furthermore, had the arrangement
been totally abortive, there likely would have been no complaint. Given
the great predictive value of an established intent, judicial administra-
tion is aided immensely by terminating the inquiry at this point.
Allison, supra note 14, at 767.
42. See, e.g., Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2477 (contested agreement does
not significantly enhance competition); Professiona Eng'rs 435 U.S. at 688-91. See
generally R. BORK supra note 4, at 19-47; L. SULLIVAN supra note 2, SS 64-68.
43. See Professional Eng'rs 435 U.S. at 688-91.
44. Justice Brandeis provided the "classic" and most frequently cited explana-
tion of the Rule of Reason in Chicago Bd. Of Trade:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such
as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether
it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine
that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the
business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after
the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, ac-
tual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist,
the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought
to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention
will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because
knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict
consequences.
246 U.S. at 238.
Actually, this "purpose or effect" analysis and the expedited per se analysis
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Balancing an agreement's benefits and costs under the Rule of
Reason does not include a consideration of social or other non-economic
benefits." Many Chicago and Harvard School analyists exclude non-
economic social factors in any application of the Rule.46
In short, under the Rule of Reason, courts focus on the purpose
behind an allegedly illegal restraint, and determine whether the defen-
dant's main purpose was to restrain competition. If a Court cannot
ascertain the existence of an anticompetitive purpose, it will then
determine whether the contested agreement or conduct has the overall
effect of promoting or suppressing competition.4" If, on balance, the
agreement's harmful anticompetitive effects outweigh the beneficial
procompetitive justifications cited by the defendants, the court will
find a § 1 violation. Unfortunately, this balancing of pro- and anti-
competitive effects is an expensive and time-consuming process. Courts
have employed a per se rule of illegality in an attempt to reduce the
expenses incurred in antitrust litigation.
are both distinct categories within the general framework of the "Rule of Reason"
analysis. See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. See also Rahl, Price Competition
and the Price Fixing Rule-Preface and Perspective, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 137, 139-40 (1962)
(Rule of Reason always applies-use of per se rule based on probability of a given
type of restraint being unreasonable). See also Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692.
However, courts will often use the phrase "Rule of Reason" to refer only to the "pur-
pose or effect" category of analysis. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 26 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (blanket license not illegal per se, but violates the Rule of Reason); GTE
Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 59 (vertical non-price restrictions to be policed under the Rule
of Reason, rather than the per se rule). In fact, this colloquial usage has become fairly
common. Unfortunately, the ambiguous use of the term "Rule of Reason" has resulted
in the widespread misinterpretation of a recent Supreme Court case. See infra notes
141-45 and accompanying text. However, for purposes of simplicity and clarity in this
note, the term "Rule of Reason" will be used as synomous with the "purpose and
effect" category of analysis.
45. Professional Eng'rs 435 U.S. at 688, 692.
46. Compare L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, S§68, 72 (analytical confusion sur-
rounding Rule of Reason, per se analysis will be resolved if the Rule is solely concern-
ed with "competition") with R. BORK, supra note 4, 22-24, 33-36 (maximization of con-
sumer welfare is sole policy goal ascribed to the Sherman Act in Standard Oil-
economic, not social, policy argument called for in Sl cases).
However, several respected antitrust authorities have called for a Rule of Reason
which incorporates social concerns-especially social concerns regarding product safety. See,
e.g., Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments-1979, 80 Col. L. REV. 1, 16, 17 n.106, 18-19
(1980); Handler, Antitrust-1978 78Col. L. REv. 1363, 1372 n.57, 1373-74 (1978). A plea for
placing weight on product safety, where doing so would suppress competition, was rejected
by the Court in Professional Eng'rs 435 U.S. 679. In that case, and once again in Maricopa
County, the Court considered Congress to be the only authority capable of revising
the Sherman Act's "competition" standard. See Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2478-79;
Professional Eng'rs 435 U.S. at 689-90.
47. Professional Eng'rs 435 U.S. at 689, 692.
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B. The Per Se Rule and the Problem of Characterization
Theoretically, the per se rule used in antitrust law is merely a
special application of the Rule of Reason.48 Once experience with a
particular type of restraint suggests that the Rule will condemn it
in the vast majority of cases, the Court conclusively presumes that
type of restraint to be illegal per se."9 The Court has adopted the per
se rule because, inter alia, the tremendous costs associated with the
Rule of Reason militate against its use in those instances where the
restraint is so "plainly anticompetitive in nature"' that it rarely will
escape condemnation by the courts under the Rule of Reason. 1
Moreover, the per se rule's generalized condemnation of plainly anti-
competitive types of restraints provides a degree of certainty and con-
sistency in the courts' application of the Sherman Act.52
48. Rahl, supra note 44, at 139-40. See also Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at
692. But see Handler, supra note 46, at 1372-74.
Judge Bork's description of the Rule of Reason standard articulated in Stan-
dard Oil illustrates the per se rule's inclusion as a separate category within the broader
Rule of Reason analysis. Judge Bork interprets Standard Oil's Rule of Reason analysis
as requiring three tests to be applied to any practice or structure. First, when a prac-
tice has no significant beneficial effect but is solely a means of restricting output,
the practice by its "inherent nature" is injurous to trade and is therefore illegal per
se. The remaining two tests are the "inherent effect" and "evidence purpose" tests.
These tests would be applied only to those cartels not illegal (per se) by their "in-
herent nature". R. BORK, supra note 4, at 36.
According to this description of the Rule of Reason, the per se rule is merely a threshold
inquiry into the nature of the alleged restraint-an inquiry which the contested ac-
tivity must endure successfully if it is to advance to the other stages of Rule of Reason
analysis (i.e., purpose and effect). See also L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, §68.
49. See Maricopa County 102 S. Ct. at 2473 (experience with particular type
of restraint enables Court to confidently predict that the Rule of Reason will condemn
it). But see Topco, 405 U.S. at 609-10 (Court's inability to balance pro- and anticompetitive
effects in vertical territorial market restraints justifies application of per se rule). See
generally L. SULLIVAN supra note 2, §72.
50. Northern Pac. R.R. 356 U.S. at 5.
51. Id. Justice Marshall stated the Court's rationale behind using and extending
the per se rule as follows:
Per se rules always contain a degree of arbitrariness. They are justified
on the assumption that the gains from imposition of the rule will far
outweigh the losses and that significant administrative advantages will
result. In other words, the potential competitive harm plus the
administrative costs of determining in what particular situations the prac-
tice may be harmful must far outweigh the benefits that may result. If
the potential benefits in the aggregate are outweighed to this degree,
then they are simply not worth identifying in individual cases.
United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 341 (1969). See also L.
SULLIVAN supra note 2, §70. But see GTE Sylvania,433 U.S. at 50 n.16 (per se rule should
not be extended solely on basis of judicial convenience and business certainty).
52. See, e.g., Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2473; Broadcast Music, 441 U.S.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 4 [1984], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol18/iss4/5
HORIZONTAL PRICE FIXING
Horizontal price-fixing was the first category of business con-
duct to which the per se rule was applied.' In United States v. Trenton
Potteries,4 the Court approved a jury instruction allowing jurors to
return a guilty verdict if they found an agreement to fix prices existed,
regardless of the reasonableness of those prices."5 Because price fix-
ing by its nature decreased competition in a given market and
increased a firm's ability to control a market, the Court found direct
horizontal price fixing to be the type of restraint which it could reliably
predict to be anticompetitive. Therefore, price fixing agreements were
in themselves unreasonable and illegal restraints of trade. 6
The direct horizontal price fixing per se rule was soon extended
to apply to indirect restraints on price. In United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co.,57 the Court scrutinized an agreement by which a
group of major oil companies bought excess supplies of "distress"
gasoline from independents. Many independents were forced to sell
large quantities of excess gasoline on a "spot" market due to a lack
of adequate storage facilities and greatly excessive production. These
"spot" market sales depressed prices to levels which at times fell below
at 8 n.11; Topco, 405 U.S. at 609 n.10. Observe that up to this point in the note, discus-
sion of the per se rule has focused on the rule as applied to broad types or categories
of conduct, such as "price fixing" in general. However, the issue of whether the per
se rule is to be extended to cover additional categories of conduct must not be con-
fused with the characterization of a particular agreement as coming within or falling
outside of a category of conduct previously declared to be illegal per se. The former
instance involves courts evaluating a type of restraint, while the latter involves the
courts characterizing a particular restraint. Compare GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (Court
eliminates per se rule extending to vertical territorial restraints) with Broadcast Music,
441 U.S. 1 (Court decides blanket license issued by ASCAP "literally" fixes prices,
but is not a per se illegal "price fix"). See also infra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
53. For inclusive listing of all categories of conduct to which the per se rule
has been applied, see supra note 16.
54. 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
55. Id. at 401.
56. The Court noted:
The aim of and result of every price-fixing agreement, if effective, is the
elimination of one form of competition... Agreements which create such
potential power [to control the market] may well be held to be in
themselves unreasonable or unlawful restraints, without the necessity of
minute inquiry whether a particular price is reasonable or unreasonable
as fixed....
Id. at 397.
57. 310 U.S. 150 (1940). For another example of "indirect" price fixing being
declared illegal per se, see Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936) (agree-
ment to adhere to previously announced prices and terms of sale illegal per se, even
though advance price announcements are legal and agreement's terms not fixed by
private agreement).
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the cost of production. 8 Defendants arranged to have each major oil
company in their group purchase the distress gasoline of one indepen-
dent as its "dancing partner" to prevent such drastic drops in price
levels.59 There was no explicit agreement on the actual prices to be
maintained; each defendant agreed to pay its "dancing partner" the
fair going market price for the distress gasoline." Thus, the defen-
dants did not directly set a market price.
The Court broadened the scope of the per se price fixing stan-
dard by characterizing this agreement as a horizontal "price fix" and
declaring it to be illegal per se.6 Although there were no allegations
of direct price fixing, the Court held that any combination "formed
for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing,
pegging or stabilizing" a commodity's price was illegal per se. 2 The
Court characterized as "price fixes" agreements which indirectly
"tampered" with price structure, as well as agreements which
explicitly "set" fixed price levels.63 Pursuant to Socony-Vacuum, courts
inspected a contested agreement to determine whether a purpose and
effect to raise, depress, fix, peg or stabilize prices existed. If such
58. Socony-Vacuum 310 U.S. at 170-71.
59. Id. at 179.
60. Id. at 180.
61. Id. at 223.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 221.
Hence, prices are fixed within the meaning of the Trenton Potteries case
if the range within which purchases or sales will be made is agreed upon,
if the prices paid or charged are to be at a certain level or on ascending
or descending scales, if they are to be uniform, or if by various formulae
they are related to the market prices. They are fixed because they are
agreed upon.
Id. at 222.
Socony-Vacuum expanded the standard used in per se characterization by declar-
ing any agreements which directly or indirectly "tampered" with price competition
to be illegal per se. Before Socony-Vacuum, courts usually characterized as illegal per
se only those agreements explicitly setting prices at a fixed level. Therefore, Socony-
Vacuum broadened the standard used by courts to determine whether a particular
agreement constituted a "price fix." In short, the term "price fix" was given a more
expansive and inclusive meaning.
Consequently, Socony-Vacuum also expanded the scope of the per se rule. If
the standard defining which types of activity constitute "price fixing" is broadened,
it logically follows that more types of agreements will be characterized as per se il-
legal "price fixes." Socony-Vacuum increased the scope of the per se rule by broaden-
ing the definition of "price fix" to include indirect "tampering" with a market's price
structure. Recall that the term "per se characterization process" merely describes a
court's scrutiny of a particular agreement using a given per se standard in order to
ascertain whether the agreement is a "price fix." See supra note 20.
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a purpose or effect was found, a court conclusively presumed that
the agreement was illegal and did not conduct further inquiry into
the effect of such arrangements on competition. 4 Thus, Socony-
Vacuum's per se standard did not provide for consideration of pro-
competitive justifications for "price fixing" agreements.
An important observation needs to be made at this point. Courts
and commentators often interpret Socony-Vacuum as removing from
price fixing cases the "purpose or effect" analy',is normally used by
courts in antitrust analysis."5 They argue that once an agreement is
characterized as a horizontal "price fix" the purpose and effect of that
agreement is irrelevant - it is illegal per se. The "purpose or effect"
referred to in this context is the purpose or effect of the agreement
on market competition. However, there still remains the task of
applying a per se price fixing standard to determine whether an alleged
restraint is actually a "price fix." Courts resort to a purpose and66
effect analysis to make this determination. Any agreement among com-
petitors arranged for the purpose, and having the effect, of directly
or indirectly inhibiting price competition is illegal per se. 7
Following Socony-Vacuum, the Court expanded the scope of the
per se price fixing rule to agreements setting maximum prices in a
vertical market context. The Court reasoned that "agreements to fix
maximum prices, no less than those to fix minimum prices, cripple
the freedom of traders and thereby restrain their ability to sell in
64. This broad definition of "price fixing" was not the only expansion of the
per se rule to be found in Socony-Vacuum. In a now-famous footnote, the Court held
that a plaintiff need not demonstrate that the defendants possessed adequate market
power to affect market prices in order to meet his burden of proof. Id. at 224 n.59.
All price fixes were banned regardless of their ability to affect market conditions,
because of their actual or potential threat to the "central nervous system of the
economy." Id. "[A] conspiracy to fix prices violates §1 of the Act though no overt
act is shown, though it is not established that the conspirators had the means available
for accomplishment of their objective, and though the conspiracy embraced but a part
of the . .. commerce in the commodity." Id. Thus, the Court's ruling also condemned
those price fixing arrangements made by combinations which had less than total con-
trol over a market. These sorts of arrangements could cause at least temporary harm
to competition, and therefore were illegal pursuant to the Sherman Act.
65. See, e.g., Rahl, supra note 44, at 139.
66. Note that the conjunctive "and" rather than the disjunctive "or" is used
to describe the test applied in per se analysis rather than Rule of Reason analysis.
Thus, in per se characterization analysis, the court must look to both the purpose and
effect of an agreement in regards to price structure whereas in the Rule of Reason
context the Court can look to either a purpose or effect regarding actual market price.
67. It is because the Socony-Vacuum test focuses on price competition instead
of actual market price that the Court considered market power to be an irrelevant
issue. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
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accordance with their own judgment."68 By condemning vertical max-
imum price restraints as illegal per se, the Court reaffirmed that the
per se rule "is grounded on faith in price competition as a market
force . . . [and] not on a policy of low selling prices at the price of
elementary competition." 9 This reaffirmation, combined with Socony-
Vacuum's broad condemnation of price fixing, suggested that horizontal
maximum price restraints would also be deemed illegal per se.7"
The Warren Court's application of Socony-Vacuum's rigid" per
se standard, a standard which increased the scope of the per se price
fixing rule, was characteristic of that Court's inclination to favor
application and extension of the per se rule.72 One can sympathize with
a court's predisposition to favor mechanical rules of illegality over
the ambiguous and complex economic analysis of the Rule of Reason:
as mentioned earlier, the common law operates through the applica-
tion of broad, generalized rules that can be applied in a mechanical
fashion.73 However, a growing dissent condemned this extensive
expansion of the per se rule. Dissenters advocated that judicial con-
venience, business certainty and litigation efficiency were not suffi-
cient in themselves to justify extension and application of the per se
rule.74 While recognizing the virtues and advantages of a properly
68. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 151 (1968) (quoting Kiefer-Stewart,
Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951)).
69. Rahl, supra note 44, at 142.
70. Maricopa County has dispelled any lingering notion that horizontal max-
imum price fixing would not be declared illegal per se. See Maricopa County 102 S.
Ct. at 2474-75. This is not to say that such an extension of Albrecht should have occurred,
but only that its extension to horizontal agreements was consistent with the reason-
ing displayed in Socony-Vacuum and Kiefer-Stewart For a discussion of Albrecht from
a Chicago School point of view, see Blair & Kasserman, The Albrecht Rule and Con-
sumer Welfare: An Economic Analysis, 33 U. Fla. L. REv. 461 (1981).
71. The Socony-Vacuum per se standard is "rigid" in the sense that any agree-
ment affecting price competition is declared illegal per se, without any inquiry regarding
the agreement's procompetitive benefits. Theoretically, an agreement with a deminimus
anticompetitive effect and substantial procompetitive benefits could be declared illegal
per se. Justice Powell expressed his extreme displeasure with this inflexible per se
characterization standard in his Maricopa County dissent. See Maricopa County 102
S. Ct. at 2480.
72. See Robinson, supra note 46, at 13 (Warren Court displayed unmistakable
propensity to favor mechanical rules of illegality over in-depth economic analysis).
The Court extended the per se rule to cover horizontal market division in Topco,
405 U.S. 596 (1972). and vertical territorial restraints in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn
& Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). In the latter case, the Court effectively overruled White
Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 255 (1963), in which it had refused to extend
the rule to such vertical non-price restraints.
73. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., GTE Sylvania 433 U.S. at 50 n. 16. "Once established, per se
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limited per se characterization analysis, these dissenters saw the per
se rule as an extraordinary remedy to be used only in exceptional
circumstances."5
An inherent tension in the per se process itself was the source
of these substantial differences of opinion among Justices and scholars
alike regarding the per se rule's proper scope."6 While the per se rule
provides certainty and efficiency in judicial enforcement of the Sher-
man Act, the per se process does not possess the Rule of Reason's
flexibility and greater accuracy." During the late 1960's and early
1970's, debate continued regarding the proper scope of the per se rule
and the role of economics in the per se characterization process. Since
that time, the Court has altered, revised, and perhaps even overruled
its position on the per se characterization process, and the debate is
far from over. The remainder of this note focuses on the ramifica-
tions this debate has created in the area of horizontal price fixing
cases.
Socony-Vacuum's rigid per se price fixing standard did not create
an entirely mechanical per se characterization process. Although a
finding of a "price fix" relieved the court from applying a "purpose
or effect" analysis, it was still required to initially perform a "purpose
and effect" analysis to determine whether the contested agreement was
a "price fix." 8 Proponents of Socony-Vacuum searched for any evidence
of a mere tampering with price structures in their per se characteriza-
tion analyses; critics of Socony-Vacuum argued for a per se process
based on "demonstrable economic effect" 9 rather than "formalistic line
drawing."" Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania' was the first major
indication that several Supreme Court Justices preferred the
economically-oriented approach in per se characterization analysis.
rules tend to provide guidance to the business community and to minimize the burdens
on litigants and the judicial system of the more complex rule-of-reason trials, [cita-
tions omitted] but those advantages are not sufficient in themselves to justify crea-
tion of per se rules." Id. See also Topco, 405 U.S. at 613 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
75. Cf Handler, supra note 46, at 983 (Court in GTE Sylvania breaks with
Warren Court's practice and treats Rule of Reason as the approach favored by the
Court and per se rule as an exceptional approach).
76. See, e.g., Topco, 405 U.S. at 613 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Container Corp.
393 U.S. at 340 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 156 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
77. "For the sake of business certainty and litigation efficiency, we have
tolerated the invalidation of some agreements [under a per se analysis] that a full-
blown inquiry might have proved to be reasonable." Maricopa County 102 S. Ct. at
2473 & n.16.
78. See supra note 66.
79. GTE Sylvania 433 U.S. at 58-59.
80. Id.
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III. GTE SYLVANIA: REFORMULATION OF
PER SE ANALYSIS?
The Supreme Court drastically altered the scope of the per se
price fixing rule with its decision in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania.82 The decision represented the first major victory for pro-
ponents of Chicago School antitrust theory. Although the case dealt
with a vertical territorial restraint, its implications for horizontal price
fixing cases and the per se price fixing standard in particular are
immense. 3
The respondent-defendant, television manufacturer GTE Sylvania,
Inc. (GTE), had limited the number of franchises it granted to retailers
in specified geographic areas.84 GTE required each franchise retailer
to sell his products only from those locations at which he was
franchised." The petitioner-plaintiff, Continental T.V., Inc. (Continen-
tal), was a successful franchised retailer of GTE television sets in San
Francisco.' Disheartened by poor sales revenues in that city, GTE
franchised another retailer for the area and located this new
distributorship approximately one mile from Continental's retail
outlet.2 Continental protested GTE's licensing of this new franchise
and retaliated by cancelling a large GTE order and placing it instead
with one of GTE's competitors.8" Shortly thereafter, GTE refused to
franchise Continental in Sacramento. Nevertheless, the latter went
ahead with plans to open a retail outlet in that city. 9 Relations be-
tween the two parties continued to deteriorate until GTE finally ter-
minated Continental's franchise altogether. GTE subsequently filed
suit to recover money purportedly owed. Continental filed a cross-
claim asserting that the territorial restriction imposed by GTE upon
franchise retailers was a per se illegal restraint of trade.
The Court, per Justice Powell, unexpectedly8 declared that this
81. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
82. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
83. GTE Sylvania's implications for horizontal price fixing cases are immense
because the case's "substance over form" analysis gives rise to an economically-oriented
methodology which is equally applicable in horizontal or vertical restraint cases. This
methodology stresses "consumer welfare" as the ultimate goal of antitrust law. See
infra text accompanying notes 110-25. See also infra text accompanying notes 152-53.
84. GTE Sylvania 433 U.S. at 38.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 38-39.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Judge Bork described the decision as coming "to the delight and astonish-
ment of much of the business world." R.BORK, supra note 4, at 286.
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vertical territorial restraint prohibiting sales outside of specified retail
outlets was not illegal per se. 1 The GTE Sylvania decision was
somewhat surprising because the Court overruled its relatively re-
cent holding in United States v. Schwinn & Co.9 Schwinn had extend-
ed the per se rule's scope to include vertical non-price restraints. The
Court in Schwinn drew a distinction in vertical markets between those
products whose title remained in the manufacturer after reaching a
retailer. and those products in which the manufacturer parted with
dominion.93 The Court declared as illegal per se any vertical restraint
by which a manufacturer "parts with dominion" over his manufactured
product yet nevertheless imposes conditions upon a wholesaler as to
whom or in what area the latter may resell the manufactured product.'
Consequently, the Court prohibited the defendant bicycle manufac-
turer from imposing on wholesalers any customer or territorial
restraints involving bicycles in which the manufacturer had
relinquished all title: these restraints were illegal per se.9 ' However,
the Court continued to apply a Rule of Reason analysis to evaluate
restraints involving bicycles in which Schwinn retained title."
Justice Powell in GTE Sylvania noted the similarities between
the distributorship plan in Schwinn and the case at bar.97 He concluded
that both cases presented the same issue, i.e., were vertical non-price
restraints per se violations of the Sherman Act?" Schwinn was not
to be distinguished.
Justice Powell proceeded to chide the Schwinn Court for its
artificial distinction between those products in which title had passed
from manufacturer to wholesaler (or retailer) and those in which title
had not so passed.9 He noted that the emphasis on passage of title
was based not on economic analysis but instead upon "formalistic line
drawing."'00 Justice Powell suggested that this arbitrary distinction
91. GTE Sylvania 433 U.S. at 57-58.
92. 388 U.S. 365 (1967). Note that only ten years had elapsed between the
Court's Schwinn and GTE Sylvania decisions.
93. Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 378-81.
94. Id. The Court's holding applied to retailers as well as distributors. Id.
at 378.
95. Id. at 379-80.
96. In 75% of all its business transactions, Schwinn retained title to its
manufactured products under the "Schwinn plan." Id. at 370. Thus, the majority of
Schwinn's transactions under franchise contracts were upheld, territorial restrictions
notwithstanding. Id. at 380. Furthermore, Schwinn's holding extended the per se rule
to include only those vertical non-price restraints on the sale of bicycles. Id.
97. Id. at 45-46.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 52-54.
100. Id. at 58-59.
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was based partially on broader social policies which he rejected.'
The Court in GTE Sylvania subjected the vertical restraint in
question to an economic analysis rather than to a social policy-oriented
analysis.' The Court's distinction between vertical restraints was
based not on title, but rather on the two different types of competi-
tion affected by those restraints-interbrand and intrabrand
competition." 3 Significantly, the Court analyzed the contested
restraint's impact on both types of competition -something the Court
previously had refused to do."0 4
Justice Powell concluded that GTE's territorial restraints in-
creased economic efficiency and benefited interbrand competition
10 5
while noting that the restraints involved in the present case and did
not significantly restrict competition.' The Justice also noted that
the majority of scholarly and judicial authority advocated applying
the Rule of Reason when analyzing vertical territorial restraints. 7
101. Justice Powell did not, to say the least, enthusiastically embrace the Har-
vard School theory that antitrust law should serve to optimize the freedom of small
independent businessmen. See id. at 53, n. 21, 56. Contra L. SULLIVAN supra note 2,
S2, at 11. See also supra note 4.
102. Chicago School proponents emphasize the value and importance of economic
analysis in antitrust's characterization process. See supra note 4. Not surprisingly, GTE
Sylvania contains much of their terminology. For example, Justice Powell mentioned
"free rider" and "efficiency" concepts to support his overruling of Schwinn. See GTE
Sylvania 433 U.S. at 55-56.
103. The intrabrand-interbrand issue arises in vertical restraint cases. Justice
Powell provided concise definitions of both these concepts:
Interbrand competition is the competition among the manufacturers
of the same generic product-television sets in this case-and is the
primary concern of antitrust law. The extreme example of a deficiency
of interbrand competition is monopoly, where there is only one manufac-
turer. In contrast, intrabrand competition is the competition between the
distributors - wholesale or retail-of the product of particular manufacturer.
Id. at 51 n.19.
104. See Topco, 405 U.S. at 609-10. See also Handler, Changing Trends in An-
titrust Doctrines: An Unprecedented Supreme Court Term- 1977 COL. L. REv. 979, 986-87
(1977) (Court's willingness in GTE Sylvania to examine effects of contested restraint
on interbrand and intrabrand competition a far different approach than one taken in
Topco).
105. GTE Sylvania , 433 U.S. at 55-56.
106. Id. at 54.
107. Id. at 57-58. Justice Powell cited a fairly extensive list of articles which
criticize d the Schwinn decision. See GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 47-48 & n.13. Not only
did Schwinn come under heavy fire from government officials and academicians, but
federal courts presented with vertical restraints analogous to those found in Schwinn
sought to diminish that case's reach by distinguishing their own cases through strained
and often tortured reasoning. Id. at 48 n.14. Justice Powell explicitly rejected the
appellate court's attempt to distinguish GTE Sylvania's vertical non-price restraints
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The Justice concluded that the standard of proof required to create
a conclusive presumption of per se illegality had not been met by
Continental. ' s Thus, the territorial restrictions at issue were seen as
requiring a Rule of Reason analysis. Schwinn was overruled.' 9
GTE Sylvania is important to any discussion of per se
characterization problems for three reasons. First, the Court reversed
the Warren Court's penchant for extending the scope of the per se
rule."' The Court's emphasis shifted from a preference for business
certainty, litigation efficiency, judicial economy and a relatively simple
and rigid application of a per se rule to a preference for the flexibility
and intense scrutiny characteristic of a Rule of Reason analysis."'
Justice Powell interpreted Northern Pacific Railroad v. United States"2
as requiring a plaintiff to show that the conduct complained of had
(or was likely to have) a "pernicious" effect on competition or was
lacking in "any redeeming virtue." Such a showing was necessary
before the Court would conclusively presume such conduct to be
unreasonable and illegal per se: Northern Pacific's holding was no
longer considered to be a merely descriptive passage."3 Broad social
policy". and judicial inability to properly measure competitive effect"'
would no longer be sufficient to warrant extension of the per se rule.
Justice Powell's formulation of a higher standard of proof made GTE
Sylvania a landmark case."6
from those found in Schwinn. Id. at 45-46. Powell also suggested that a split in the
circuits might have prompted the Court to grant certiorari to hear the case. 433 U.S.
42 n.11, 53 n.21.
The Court's refusal to apply the per se rule to a vertical restraint only four
years prior to Schwinn in White Motor Co. v. United States 372 U.S. 253 (1963), became
another focal point in attacking the Schwinn decision. Justice Powell referred to White
Motor Co. while questioning the wisdom and precedential value of Schwinn. GTE
Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 50-51.
108. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 57-59. See infra text accompanying note 113.
109. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 57-59.
110. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. See also supra note 75.
111. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
112. 356 U.S. 1 (1958). "[Tlhere are certain agreements or practices which because
of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are con-
clusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal...." Id. at 5.
113. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 50-51, 57-59. See also Handler, supra note 104,
at 982 (Justice Powell makes Northern Pacifc explanation of per se conduct as "plainly
anticompetitive and without lack of any redeeming virtue" into a factual requirement-a
new standard is formulated).
114. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., Topco, 405 U.S. at 609-10 (courts' inability to effectively weigh
destruction of competition in one sector of economy against promotion of competition
in another is one important reason for courts to formulate per se rules).
116. Many lower federal courts and state courts alike quickly adopted this
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Second, the balancing test used by Justice Powell to determine
whether an agreement was devoid of "any redeeming virtue" became
an integral feature of the Court's per se characterization process.
Justice Powell balanced the procompetitive effects of GTE's restraint
against its anticompetitive effects to determine whether the per se
rule of Schwinn should be repealed or affirmed.117 Unless a balancing
test suggested a net anticompetitive effect so great as to meet the
burden stipulated in Northern Pacific, GTE's restraint would not be
categorized as illegal per se."8 This balancing approach represents a
more lenient, flexible approach to applying the per se rule. GTE
Sylvania does not contain the rigid, inflexible"9 language of Trenton
Potteries and Socony-Vacuum.20
There was a possibility that GTE Sylvania's balancing test would
not be applied in per se characterizaion cases. GTE Sylvania did not
involve a characterization issue: the contested restriction clearly was
a territorial restraint of trade. 2 ' However, lower courts were soon
burden of proof concept. See, e.g., Guild Wineries and Distilleries v. J. Sosnick & Sons,
99 Cal. App. 3d 205, 212, 160 Cal. Rptr. 201, 205 (1980) (per se principles formulated
where conduct is manifestly anticompetitive and has no clearly discernable benefits
to competition).
117. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54-59.
118. See id. at 57-59. Justice Powell's use of a balancing test based on economic
analysis may have eliminated the "inherent nature" test of per se illegality articulated
in Standard Oil. See supra note 48. Presumably, a restraint's nature can be revealed
by balancing its pro- and anticompetitive effects. If the restraint is by nature
anticompetitive with little or no procompetitive justifications, the conduct will be found
to be "pernicious." Unfortunately, the Court did not describe what degree of imbalance
creates a finding of perniciousness.
A balancing test which de-emphasizes the nature of a restraint also de-emphasizes
judicial experience as an integral factor in determining whether certain kinds of con-
duct are to be characterized as "illegal per se." As long as a judge can apply an economic
analysis and identify pro- and anticompetitive conduct, judicial experience is unnecessary.
Of course, economic expertise is necessary, and therefore some experience with the
type of restraint being contested is needed.
119. See supra note 71.
120. Prior to GTE Sylvania several Supreme Court decisions which involved
neither horizontal or price restraints had cited to Socony-Vacuum. See, e.g., Schwinn,
388 U.S. at 375. The Court cited Socony-Vacuum to support its extending the per
se rule, even though that case did not address vertical or non-price restraints. See
Topco, 405 U.S. at 611; United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 300, 355 (1967).
121. The question before the Court in GTE Sylvania was whether a category
of prohibited conduct itself, i.e., vertical territorial restraints, should be proscribed
as illegal per se. The Court was not asked to characterize GTE's territorial restriction
- the restriction clearly constituted a vertical non-price restraint of trade. Thus, the
case differs significantly from Socony-Vacuum and Trenton Potteries and other
characterization cases. In those cases, the category of conduct prohibited per se was
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using GTE Sylvania's balancing test to determine whether a contested
agreement constituted a type of restraint already determined to be
illegal per se. In short, GTE Sylvania is relevant to a discussion of
per se characterization because lower courts used Justice Powell's
balancing test to determine whether a contested agreement constituted
a "price fix.'
22
Finally, Justice Powell's use of a Chicago School analysis
foreshadowed the Broadcast Music decision and the Justice's vigorous
dissent in Maricopa County. Justice Powell's consideration of economic
efficiencies created by vertical territorial restraints, his use of a "free-
rider" theory to justify these restraints, and his explicit rejection of
the Schwinn Court's policy preference for small, independent
businessmen was in keeping with Chicago School theory."3 Although
Justice Powell's use of economic analysis might well have been limited
to those instances in which the Court considered extending or
restricting the per se rule, the Justice promoted use of the rule in
different contexts as well.'24 The Court's disdain for formalistic line
drawing and conceptual rigidity, as well as its approval of economic
analysis, suggested that this economic approach might be extended
from vertical territorial restraints to horizontal restraints.'25
GTE Sylvania was an unmistakable "victory" for proponents of
Chicago School antitrust ideology. However, Justice Powell's fondness
for the Chicago School approach was not shared by all of his brethren
on the Court. The next significant Supreme Court antitrust case to
follow GTE Sylvania did not contain any of the Chicago School's
methodology or terminology.
IV. PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS: RETURN TO A
SOCONY-VACUUM PER SE STANDARD?
Professional Engineers' was the first Supreme Court decision
following GTE Sylvania to shed any significant light on the nature
of the per se characterization process. At issue in Professional
Engineers was an engineering society's ethical canon which prohibited
not contested-no one suggested that horizontal "price fixes" be scrutinized under
the Rule of Reason. Rather, the cases involved characterization questions, e.g., "Did
the activity constitute a'price fix'?"
122. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466 (1982) (Powell,
J., dissenting); Broadcast Music v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
123. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 4, at 41-47, 285-91. See also supra note 4.
124. See, e.g., Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2480 (Powell, J., dissenting).
125. Such an extension indeed occurred. See Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
126. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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engineers from negotiating with a prospective client about fees until
after that client had selected a single engineer for a given project.127
The canon prohibited other engineers from providing the client with
comparative price information so long as that client employed that
particular engineer. The canon, in effect, constituted a ban on com-
petitive bidding.'28
The specific issue before the Court was whether the district court
was obligated to consider the engineering society's justifications for
its ban on competitive bidding before the court declared the ban
illegal." The district court did not consider the society's justifications
for the ban because the court believed the prohibition constituted a
"tampering with the price structure of engineering fees in violation
of §1 of the Sherman Act."13' The Supreme Court, per Justice Stevens,
affirmed the district and cirtuit courts' refusal to consider the society's
purported justifications for the ban-the Court declared the agree-
ment illegal on its face."' In doing so, the Court dismissed the society's
argument that price competition in engineering fees led to inferior
work and adversely affected public health, safety and welfare. 2'
There are three reasons for Professional Engineers being included
in any discussion of the per se characterization process. First, the Court
in Professional Engineers failed to use the Chicago School terminology
employed in GTE Sylvania and instead cited Socony-Vacuum with ap-
proval. This approval of Socony-Vacuum raised doubts as to whether
the Court would consider "consumer welfare" and "productive effi-
ciency" arguments in future per se and Rule of Reason analyses. Se-
cond, "competition" was made the sole standard by which to gauge
an activity's legality under both the per se rule and the Rule of Reason:
127. 435 U.S. at 683-84.
128. Id. at 700. The government alleged that the Society of Professional
Engineer's ethical canon suppressed "price competition," a phrase which entails both
explicit price fixing and agreements which tamper with the price structure as well.
See supra text accompanying note 63.
Professional Eng'rs did not raise the issue of whether the per se rule should
be extended to yet another category of conduct. Unlike GTE Sylvania, there was no
question that the type of restraint deemed illegal per se in Professional Eng'rs, i.e.,
horizontal price fixing, was properly categorized as per se illegal conduct. Instead, the
only question in Professional Eng'rs was whether an engineering society's ban on com-
petitive bidding should be characterized as a price fix at all. The two cases are fun-
damentally different in this regard. See supra note 121. See also infra note 137 and
accompanying text.
129. Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 681.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 693.
132. Id. at 694-95.
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non-economic social concerns would not justify an agreement which
was anticompetitive in character. Third, the Court's failure in Profes-
sional Engineers to articulate the nature and scope of its analysis,
its failure to explicitly characterize the society's ethical canon as il-
legal per se, and its subsequent emphasis on the canon's lack of pro-
competitive benefits created a great deal of confusion as to whether
a Rule of Reason analysis or per se analysis had been applied.
A. Professional Engineers: Rejection of GTE Sylvania
and "Consumer Welfare?"
While both GTE Sylvania and Professional Engineers elaborate
on the Rule of Reason and per se rule, the cases contain different
interpretations and applications of these tools of antitrust analysis.
Justice Powell in GTE Sylvania emphasized a return to economic
analysis and an end to "formalistic line drawing" in defining the scope
of per se rule.'33 Justice Stevens in Professional Engineers referred
to GTE Sylvania, but only to buttress his argument that "competi-
tion was the sole standard of the Rule of Reason."'" In treating the
ethical canon as a "price fix" because it suppressed price competi-
tion, Justice Stevens cited Socony-Vacuum and noted that "no
elaborate industry analysis is needed to demonstrate that the agree-
ment has an anticompetitive character."'35 The Court stressed the
vague term "competition," leaving open for argument whether that
term heralded a return to a per se characterization standard based
on considerations other than consumer welfare and sophisticated
economic analysis. 3
The absence of both Chicago School terminology and an economic
efficiency analysis in Professional Engineers does not necessarily imply
that the case is inconsistent with GTE Sylvania. Since GTE Sylvania
dealt with Schwinn's extension of the per se rule to a category of
133. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 691 & n.17.
135. 435 U.S. at 692-93.
136. Indeed, Justice Stevens' description of the Rule of Reason as a balancing
test which determined only whether competition was promoted or suppressed by a
contested agreement was not enthusiastically welcomed by those Chicago School pro-
ponents who had warmly embraced the GTE Sylvania decision. See, e.g., R. POSNER
& F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST: CASES ECONOMIC NOTES, AND OTHER MATERIALS, 258-62
(2d Ed. 1981).
Most observers, however, did agree with the Court's refusal to consider non-
economic concerns and social policy in both the per se and Rule of Reason analyses.
See, e.g., id.; L. SULLIVAN Supra note 2, §72. But see Robinson, supra note 46, at 16-20;
Handler, supra note 46, at 1372-73.
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conduct theretofore subject to Rule of Reason analysis, careful
economic analysis was necessary before the Court would generalize
a certain type of restraint as being illegal per se. Professional
Engineers merely involved characterizing a particular ban on bidding
as being within or outside of the "price fixing" category of conduct,
an area with which the Court had much experience."7 Nevertheless,
the Court's emphasis on and elaboration of "competition"'38 as the sole
standard of review and the sole goal of the Sherman Act, combined
with the omission of Chicago School terminology from the opinion,
suggested that not all members of the Court accepted the Chicago
School concept of "consumer welfare."'
139
B. Competition as the Sole Standard for Evaluating
Conduct and Restraints
Justice Stevens in Professional Engineers declared competition
to be the sole standard for the per se characterization process. By
indirectly characterizing the society's ethical canon as a per se illegal
"price fix," the Court looked solely to the effects of that canon on
price competition. Justice Stevens explicitly rejected any defense
based on the desirability of eliminating competition in the public
interest. Thus, Justice Stevens reaffirmed Socony-Vacuum's dictate
that in determining whether a joint venture is a "price fix" for pur-
poses of per se illegality only the venture's effect on competitive fac-
tors should be considered. "' However, Professional Engineers failed
to reveal whether competitive factors such as productive efficiency
and efficient resource allocation would be given greater or lesser
weight than other competitive concerns, such as the economic
autonomy of the small businessman.
C. Professional Engineers: Per Se or Rule of Reason Analysis?
Justice Stevens' failure to articulate the relationship between
the per se rule and the Rule of Reason, and his failure to explicitly
state whether the ethical canon at issue was a "price fix" generated
a great amount of confusion as to whether the Justice had applied
137. Professional Eng'rs in short, only required the Court to determine whether
or not the ethical canon was a "price fix"; it was taken as a given fact that the category
of conduct involved in the case (price fixing) was properly regarded as illegal per se.
138. Handler, supra note 46, at 1364.
139. See supra note 4.
140. See Handler, supra note 46, at 1371. However, many lower courts have
considered social and non-economic benefits arising out of a contested agreement,
especially when those benefits involve product safety. Taylor, supra note 16, at 194-95.
1032
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 4 [1984], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol18/iss4/5
19841 HORIZONTAL PRICE FIXING 1033
a per se or Rule of Reason analysis."' The Justice referred to these
two analytical tools as "complementary categories of analysis" within
the single analytical framework known as the "Rule of Reason."4 '
Justice Stevens was careful not to label that category of analysis
involving a comprehensive extensive balancing test as the "Rule of
Reason." ' Therefore, when Justice Stevens referred to the "Rule of
Reason" throughout his opinion he most likely was referring to both
categories of antitrust analysis."' Unfortunately, Justice Stevens'
failure to articulate this important point led many scholars to deter-
mine he had declared the canon illegal not by use of the per se rule
but by employment of the more intricate balancing test.4 '
Moreover, Justice Stevens' internally inconsistent analysis of the
ethical canon's effect on price competition heightened uncertainty as
to whether the Justice had employed a Rule of Reason or per se
analysis. On the one hand, the Justice approved a district court's use
of Socony-Vacuum per se price fixing standard: this standard defined
a "price fix" as any agreement which tampered with price
competition.146 The Justice concluded that the agreement did have an
141. Compare Sullivan & Wiley, Recent Antitrust Developments: Defining the
Scope of Exemption, Expanding Coverage, and Refining the Rule of Reason, 27 UCLA
L. REV. 265, 323 (1979) ("the Court applied the Rule of Reason rather than the per se rule")
with Maricopa County 102 S. Ct. at 2483 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[I]n Nat'l Soc'y of
Professional Eng'rs, we held unlawful as a per se violation a canon of ethics...."); Flynn,
Rethinking Sherman Act Section 1 Analysis: Three Proposals for Reducing the Chaos,
49 ANTITRUST L.J. 1953, 1594 (1980) (Court applied per se rule in Professional Eng'rs after
discussing Rule of Reason for several pages in the opinion).
The fact that these eminent antitrust authorities cannot agree as to what category
of antitrust analysis (Rule of Reason or per se) was applied is testimony to the enigmatic
character of Professional Eng'rs
142. Professional Eng'rs 435 U.S. at 692. As mentioned above, this conception
of the Rule of Reason and per se rule's interrelationship is theoretically correct. See
supra notes 44, 48.
143. See Professional Eng'rs 435 U.S. at 690-91.
144. The Justice's remarks in Maricopa County buttress this assertion: "[T]he
Court ... recognized that inquiry under its Rule of Reason ended once a price fixing
agreement was proven." 102 S. Ct. at 2473.
145. Thus, Professor Sullivan interprets Professional Eng'rs as calling for an
expedited Rule of Reason analysis whenever possible. However, the Maricopa County
opinion, in conjunction with Professional Eng'rs suggests that rather than encourag-
ing an expedited Rule of Reason process, Justice Stevens in the latter case advocated
a strict limitation on the kinds of factors considered under the Rule of Reason (i.e.,
only economic, competitive effects), but not a limitation on the process's length. The
analysis in Professional Eng'rs was indeed expedited, but only because the per se price-
fixing rule was applied.
146.435 U.S. at 686. See also supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
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anticompetitive effect on price competitionY.17 On the other hand,
Justice Stevens completed his analysis of the contested conduct by
concluding that the ethical canon lacked any procompetitive benefits
which could be balanced against its anticompetitive effects. 148 This
additional demonstration of anticompetitiveness was both unnecessary
and inappropriate; the canon had already been characterized as a per
se illegal "price fix" due to its adverse effect on price competition.
Many observers interpreted Justice Stevens' consideration of anti- and
procompetitive effects to constitute a Rule of Reason balancing test.49
More significantly, some academicians concluded that Stevens' analysis
in Professional Engineers called for a balancing of an agreement's pro-
and anticompetitive effects in the per se characterization stage 5'- a
conclusion which is at odds with Socony-Vacuum's "tampering" stan-
dard of per se illegality. 5'
In summary, the Court's position as to how it would conduct the
per se characterization process was unclear after Professional
Engineers. While the Court in Professional Engineers approved a per
se characterization standard similar to that used in Socony-Vacuum,
the Court in GTE Sylvania utilized an alternative per se standard
which could easily be extended to apply to per se characterizations.'52
Since GTE Sylvania's "consumer welfare" and "economic efficiency"
theories allowed for interference in price competition so long as
economic efficiency was created, the Court could extend such a con-
sumer welfare analysis from the GTE Sylvania context to per se
147. Id. at 693, 695.
148. Professional Eng'rs 435 U.S. at 692-95.
149. "I think almost everyone reads the Professional Engineers case as a per
se ruling, yet the analysis undertaken by the Court is much more typical of what
we expect to find in a rule of reason case." Taylor, supra note 16, at 192. See also
supra note 141.
150. The most prominent member of this group was Justice Powell. In his dis-
sent in Maricopa County, Justice Powell criticized the majority for not conducting a
proper balancing of pro- and anticompetitive effects in its per se characterization process.
He cited Professional Eng'rs as a case in which the Court conducted such a balancing
test. 102 S. Ct. at 2482-83. However, Justice Stevens emphatically stated that the
characterization analyses undertaken in both Maricopa County and Professional Eng'rs
considered only those effects which the agreement had on price competition. Id. at
2477. Thus, the per se characterization process is limited to considerations of those
factors which would indicate whether price has been stabilized.
151. The inclusion of a balancing test in the per se characterization stage is
inconsistent with Socony-Vacuum because that case called for a prescription of per se
illegality once an agreement was found to tamper with price competition regardless
of that agreement's procompetitive benefits. See supra note 71.
152. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
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characterization cases' 3 involving issues similar to those present in
Professional Engineers.1 4 Court observers awaited future Court deci-
sions so as to ascertain which per se standard, GTE Sylvania's or
Socony-Vacuum's, would be adopted by the Court.' 5
V. BROADCAST MuSIC: ASCENDANCY OF THE CHICAGO SCHOOL
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System'" was the
first Supreme Court decision following Professional Engineers to fur-
ther elaborate on the per se characterization process in horizontal price
fixing cases. Unfortunately, the case did little to eradicate the confu-
sion generated by the Court's previous holdings.
Broadcast Music raised the issue of whether certain joint con-
duct should be characterized as "price fixing."'5 Composers formed
the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP)
in an effort to enforce their statutory right to license the public per-
formances of their works for profit.'" Both ASCAP and Broadcast
Music, Inc. (BMI) operated as "clearinghouses" for copyright owners
and performers."9 Owners gave these two organizations the non-
exclusive right to license their works.O The clearinghouses then issued
licenses to users Which allowed the latter to perform copyrighted
153. Id. See also R. BORK, supra note 4, at 279.
154. As mentioned previously, Professional Eng'rs involved the application of
the per se rule in a particular context. The issue in these sorts of price fixing
characterization cases is not whether conduct constituting "price fixing" should be
declared illegal per se, but instead whether the agreement is a "price fix" at all. See
supra notes 121, 137 and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., Sullivan & Wiley, supra note 141, at 324-25.
156. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
157. See supra note 154. Thus, Broadcast Music and Professional Eng'rs dealt
with similar issues. Both cases involve questions of "characterization" rather than
extension or non-extension of the per se standard. Once a defendant's conduct had
been characterized as constituting "price fixing," it was thought that Socony-Vacuum,
Trenton Potteries and their progeny required a finding of per se illegality. But see infra
notes 183-90 and accompanying text.
Copyright owners of musical compositions have possessed this statutory right
since 1897. Copyright Act of January 6, 1897, 29 Stat. 281.
Because performers can easily use a copyrighted work, and because performances
can be numerous, widespread and fleeting, it is often difficult for individual copyright
owners to negotiate with and to license performers who desire to use their composi-
tions. It is also extremely difficult to detect unauthorized uses. Broadcast Music 441
U.S. at 5.
159. ASCAP and BMI accounted for virtually the entire market for copyrighted
compositions. Id.
160. In using a non-exclusive license, the owners retained the right to negotiate
individually with users of their material. Id.
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material without fear of suit.' Thus, users were not required to
negotiate with owners every time the former wished to perform a
copyrighted composition. Likewise, individual owners were not com-
pelled to license every such performance of their works.'62
Both clearinghouses operated under a consent decree as a result
of an earlier antitrust action brought against them by the
government.'63 Under the decree, the groups were allowed to issue
blanket licenses authorizing a user to perform any and all of the works
in the clearinghouses' repertoire as often as the licensee-user desired
for a stated period of time.'64 The fee charged for this blanket license
was either a flat dollar amount or a percentage of the user's adver-
tising revenues.'65 Neither mode of fee-charging was based on the
amount or type of compositions used.'
CBS desired a license on a per use basis from both ASCAP and
BMI. The network brought suit against both clearinghouses since it
could not amend the consent decree.6 7 CBS alleged that the blanket
license system used by ASCAP and BMI constituted "price fixing"
and therefore was illegal per se'68 The district court found no such
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. This earlier case had been initiated by the Justice Department to enjoin
ASCAP from acquiring an exclusive license from copyright owners. Id. at 10-11. See
United States v. ASCAP, 1940-43 Trade Case 556,104 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
164. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 5. Under the consent decree, neither ASCAP
nor BMI could grant a user a license to perform one or more specified compositions
without both the user and the owner requesting in writing for the organization to
do so. Id. at 11.
165. Id. at 5. In addition, under the 1950 consent decree and later amendments
to it, both ASCAP and BMI were required to sell licenses based on a per program
basis as well as on an annual (specified time period) basis. Under a per program license,
the user fee is determined by calculating the number of programs using ASCAP and
BMI compositions and the amount of advertising revenues those programs generate
for the individual user. Id. at 11. However, virtually all television stations hold "annual"
blanket licenses. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors
and Publishers, 562 F.2d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 1977).
166. Broadcast Music 441 U.S. at 5. As the circuit court noted in its opinion,
"[N]either [license] permits the licensee to pay only for those compositions which it
actually uses, and the per program license should not be confused with a per use
license." CBS v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d at 134. Justice Stevens, in his dissent, stated that
the blanket license system used by ASCAP and BMI was price discriminatory due
to this lack of correlation between the fee charged and actual use. See Broadcast Music
441 U.S. at 30-32.
167. CBS v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d at 134. See also Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United
States, 366 U.S. 683, 689-90 (1961) (private parties not prevented from bringing an-
titrust action against organization operating pursuant to government consent decree).
168. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 6.
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per se violation because CBS could still negotiate with individual
copyright owners for use of the latter's material if the network did
not wish to obtain a blanket license from ASCAP or BMI.16 9 The
district court consequently dismissed the CBS' complaint. 17' The court
of appeals reversed the district court decision and found that the
blanket licenses reduced price competition among composers and dulled
their incentive to compete individually through separate negotiations
with users such as CBS.171
169. Id.
170. CBS v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d at 132.
171. Id. at 136, 139. The appellate court cited Socony-Vacuum in support of
its position:
[W]hen any group of sellers or licensors continues to sell their pro-
ducts through a single agency with a single price, competition on price
by the individual seller has been restrained . . . [T]he determination of
how much each copyright owner gets from the common pot is an artificial
fixing of the price to that member of the combination for his compensa-
tion. His distributive share of royalties may be greater than he would
receive in a free market. In such case, even if the members of the com-
bination are willing not only to join in the blanket license, but also to
sell their individual performing rights separately, the combination is never-
theless a "combination which tampers with price structures [and therefore]
engage[s] in unlawful activity."
CBS v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d at 136 (quoting Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 221 (1940)).
However, the appellate court later stipulated that blanket licenses did not in-
evitably effect price competition among composers. 562 F.2d at 140. The court sug-
gested that if a blanket license could be devised to encourage the composers to com-
pete, or at least not discourage them from competing, the license might not be declared
illegal per se. Id.
Thus, the circuit court saw the non-exclusive character of the blanket license
to be irrelevant. The license itself impaired price competition because it dulled a com-
poser's incentive to compete, and was therefore illegal per se. Id. at 139-40.
Although the appellate court adapted Socony-Vacuum's rigid "price tampering"
per se standard, Judge Gurfein did consider ASCAP's defense of "market necessity,"
a defense which he recognized as a legitimate "exception" to the broad per se rule
for price fixing espoused in Socony-Vacuum. However, the judge subsequently rejected
this defense because the existence of a direct negotiating market undermined the
"market necessity" of a blanket license. Id. at 138. See CBS v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d at
136. Interestingly enough, as Justice Stevens notes, ASCAP's defense to a finding of per
se illegality under past Supreme Court block-booking and package-licensing case law
was that its blanket license was non-exclusive: CBS could always enter negotiations
with individual composers for a license to use the latter's compositions. See Broadcast
Music, 441 U.S. at 29. Cf. Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339
U.S. 827 (1950). Yet the circuit court disallowed the one "exception" it saw to Socony-
Vacuum's broad per se price fixing rule precisely because of the availability of this
alternative. 562 F.2d at 138. Apparently, ASCAP and BMI were doomed to lose! Judge
Gurfein recognized this dilemma as well. Id.
Finally, note that the case is somewhat confusing due to the presence of ASCAP
and BMI as intermediate licensors. The circuit court found the blanket license to be
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The case presented the Supreme Court with an opportunity to
affirm the circuit court's Socony-Vacuum analysis by finding any
"tampering" with prices to constitute per se illegal "price fixing.
'1 72
Such a finding would have reinforced not only the Socony-Vacuum
and Professional Engineers cases, but also vertical restraint cases
based on Socony-Vacuum reasoning.173 Instead, the Court, per Justice
White, found that the blanket license used by ASCAP and BMI was
not a "price fix" deserving of per se illegality pursuant to 5 1 of the
Sherman Act.174 The Court remanded the decision back to the court
of appeals for a determination of the blanket license's "reasonableness"
or lack thereof under a Rule of Reason analysis.'
According to Justice White, the appellate court's own remedy
suggested that it had erred in characterizing the agreement as a per
se illegal price fix. The Justice noted that the court of appeals allowed
for the continued existence of the blanket license, albeit in a per-use
rather than per-program or annual form.'76 The appellate court deci-
sion declared ASCAP's blanket license to be illegal per se, yet did
not bar blanket licenses across the board-such licenses would be per-
mitted in those circumstances where it was necessary and would
"serve a market need."'77 The suggestion of such a remedy, Justice
White reasoned, flatly undermined the lower court's finding of per
se illegality.' Such per se status should be applied only to those prac-
tices which were so "'plainly anticompetitive ... and so often 'lack[ing]
any redeeming virtue' . . . that they may be conclusively presumed
illegal without further examination."'7 9 The appellate court's sugges-
a price fix because it established a single blanket fee which artificially affected the
fee which an individual composer would receive for use of his work. The Supreme
Court noted the uniqueness of Broadcast Music's factual context and determined that
the case was one of first impression. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 10.
172. See supra note 171.
173. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 151 (1968); Kiefer-Stewart Co.
v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951). The continued vitality of these
two cases had been in doubt following GTE Sylvania. Taylor, supra note 16, at 190-91.
See also R. BORK, supra note 4, at 285-98.
174. Id. at 7.
175. Id. at 24-25.
176. Id. at 7 n.10.
177. Id. at 17 n.27. Morover, the Court noted that the court of appeals had
not enjoined ASCAP's or BMI's use of the blanket license. Id.
178. Id. at 17 n.27, 24. The Justice observed: "[Tlhe per se approach does not
yield [itself] so rigidly to circumstances . . .The enigmatic remarks of the Court of
Appeals with respect to remedy appear to have departed from the Court's strict, per
se approach and to have invited a more careful analysis." Id.
179. Id. at 8 (quoting Northern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 365 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
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tion that a blanket license might be beneficial in some instances, 8 °
the Justice Department's approval of this license, 8' and Congress'
employment of blanket licenses in the new Copyright Act'82 further
militated against a finding of per se illegality.
Although the Court's actual holding was important because of
its refusal to find a "per se price fix," Justice White's dicta was of
greater significance. In dicta the Justice articulated the difficulties
faced by courts in determining whether given conduct can be
characterized as "price fixing."'8 3 Bringing back memories of Justice
Powell's condemnation of "formalistic line drawing" in GTE Sylvania,
Justice White declared that "price fixing," while a useful label in
describing certain categories of proscribed business behavior, can be
overbroad and overly simplistic if used in a literal sense.' Justice
White declared that "literal" price fixing is not always a per se viola-
tion; only that category of price fixing which is characterized as "per
se price fixing ' is considered to be illegal per se.'
Justice White's per se characterization theory seems to contradict
the rigid per se characterization analysis advocated by Justice Douglas
in Socony-Vacuum. Justice White's statement that "[not] all
arrangements among actual or potential competitors that have an
impact on price are per se violations of the Sherman Act or even
unreasonable restraints"'87 is clearly at odds with Socony-Vacuum's
dictate that any tampering with price competition, whether it be
raising, depressing, pegging or stabilizing prices, is illegal per se.'88
Justice White's assertion not only allows some agreements which
180. Id. at 17 n.27.
181. Id. at 13.
182. Id. at 15.
183. Professor Sullivan states that Broadcast Music's real significance lies in
the "explicitness with which it identifies and discusses this characterization process."
Sullivan & Wiley, supra note 141, at 332.
184. Id. at 8-9. Similarly, another commentator has noted that the use of labels
such as "price fixing" sometimes serves to obscure rather than to clarify. All that
is actually accomplished by use of a label such as "price fixing" is the statement of
a conclusion. Taylor, supra note 16, at 186.
185. Note that the label "per se price fixing" is a new label which is not to
be confused with the simple "price fixing" label. The former term implies that not
all price fixes will be illegal per se.
Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 9. Justice White cited Addyston Pipe as support
for his assertion that not all "price fixes" are illegal per se.
187. Broadcast Music 441 U.S. at 23.
188. Professor Robinson underestimates the importance and breadth of this
statement. Although explicitly mentioning the obvious inconsistency with Socony-Vacuum
and implying he was shocked upon his first reading of it, he notes that Justice White
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tamper with price competition to escape per se illegality, but also
declares that some of those agreements may even be legal.189
Justice White candidly admitted that the licensing arrangement
at issue in Broadcast Music resulted in "literal" price fixing. 9 '
However, rather than declare the blanket license illegal per se because
of its obvious effect on price competition, the Court found the license
to be outside the category of "per se price fixing" because it reduced
the high transaction costs that were an inherent flaw in the copyright
market.' Thus, by emphasizing the creation of economic efficiencies
was merely referring to activities long considered under a Rule of Reason analysis,
i.e., horizontal merger and joint ventures. Robinson, supra note 47, at 24.
However, Professor Robinson fails to recognize that the Court used Chicago
School concepts of contract integration and creation of otherwise non-existent economic
efficiencies to reverse the court of appeals' per se characterization. Id. at 19-20; See
ANTITRUST ADVISOR, supra note 24, §1.29 at 15; R. BORK, supra note 4, at 263-79; L.
SULLIVAN, supra note 2, §§76,77. The Court cited to a passage in Professor Sullivan's
treatise in which the author relates that economic efficiencies resulting from substan-
tial integration will justify some restraints of trade. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 20
(citing L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, §59, at 154).
Moreover, Justice White's use of horizontal mergers and joint ventures as
examples of legal restriants of trade is entirely consistent with a literal reading of
his statement as rejecting an absolute ban on arrangements affecting price. Judge
Bork has long held that horizontal price fixes should be treated no different than horizon-
tal mergers if it can be found that such effects on price competition were ancillary
to a contract integration: that is, the price fix was not created for the sole purpose
of restricting competition, increases the effectiveness of the integration, and is no
broader than necessary. R. BORK, supra note 4, at 279. Seec also supra note 16. Thus,
with all respect to Professor Robinson, Justice White's statement does apply to price
fixing agreements and should not be limited to the examples he provided in his opinion.
Professor Liebeler, who, like Judge Bork, advocates an economical approach to
price fixing based on consumer welfare and economic efficiencies created through
integration, supports this literal reading of Justice White's statement. While bemoan-
ing the Court's failure to establish rules for when a price setting might be found illegal
under the Rule of Reason, he notes: "It is a considerable accomplishment, however,
for the Court to recognize that some kinds of price fixing are subject to rule ofreason
analysis." ANTITRUST ADVISOR, supra note 24, §1.29 at 12-13.
189. Thus, Justice White's opinion recognizes three different types of price
fixing: price fixing that is illegal per se, price fixing found to be illegal after a Rule
of Reason analysis, and price fixing found to be legal under a Rule of Reason analysis.
See ANTITRUST ADVISOR, supra note 24, §1.29, at 12-13.
190. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 9.
191. The Court had found the costs associated with negotiating with individual
composers to be prohibitive for smaller users. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 20. Thus,
the founding of ASCAP and BMI and their subsequent issuance of blanket licenses
resulted in the creation of a service allowing users rapid and undemnified access to
any composition they desired, and protected composers' statutory rights as well. Id.
Neither of these benefits would have been possible without the integration of the com-
posers' "sale, monitoring and enforcement" resources, which effectively reduced the
market's high transaction costs. Id.
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through contract integration, '92 the Court altered its per se
characterization standard. Consequently, the Court shifted the focus
of its per se characterization analysis in the price fixing context from
an analysis of price structure to one that emphasized the presence
of substantial and otherwise unattainable economic efficiencies which
were attained through integration.'93 Socony-Vacuum's per se standard,
which analyzed effects on price competition and precluded defenses
based on economic efficiency-creating potential, was for all practical
purposes rejected by the Court. '94
Justice White provided a new standard for determining whether
or not an agreement fell within the category of "per se price fixing."
Courts were now to assess whether the contested practice was one
that "facially appear[ed] to . . .always or almost always restrict com-
petition and decrease output . .. or instead . . . [was] designed to
increase economic efficiency and render markets more, rather than
less, competitive.""19 Simply stated, the Court's new per se standard
allowed for an agreement's fixing of prices or tampering with price
competition provided two requirements were met. First, the agree-
ment must produce substantial procompetitive efficiencies. Secondly,
those efficiencies must not be realizable in the absence of the agree-
ment. '96
This new per se standard calls for a more extended analysis of
defendant firms' market power and increased economic efficiencies
resulting from integration of the firms' productive resources. If an
agreement literally "fixing" prices does not create or cannot poten-
tially create such procompetitive efficiencies, the price fix will be
declared illegal per se.'9' Of course, agreements which exhibit substan-
tial and otherwise unattainable economic efficiencies would not
192. See supra note 191.
193. See, e.g., Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2483 (1982).
194. The assertion that Socony-Vacuum does not take account of economic effi-
ciencies resulting from integration (such as higher productivity through lower tran-
saction costs) is by no means a novel one. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, §74, at 200
(Socony-Vacuum does not include one important consideration - that the Sherman Act
does not make-unlawful-arrangements which-eitheraffectprice by improving competi-
tion or increase productivity through economies of scale); ANTITRUST ADVISOR supra
note 24, S1.29 at 17 (Socony-Vacuum language not consistent with Broadcast Music).
This assertion is buttressed by the fact that the appellate court decision overruled
in Broadcast Music relied heavily on Socony-Vacuum's per se characterization theory.
See supra note 171.
195. Broadcast Music 441 U.S. at 19-20.
196. Justice Powell iterated this interpretation of Broadcast Music's per se price
fixing standard in his dissent to Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2483-84.
197. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 154. Under Judge Bork's model, an agree-
ment without sufficient integration would not be capable of maximizing consumer wealth
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automatically be declared per se legal-these pacts would merely
escape per se illegality and be subjected to a Rule of Reason analysis.'
Broadcast Music's new per se standard also raised the plaintiff's
burden in proving that a contested agreement constituted a "per se
price fix." Under Justice White's standard, as rephrased by Justice
Powell in Maricopa County,'0 an agreement found to tamper with the
market price structure would not be declared illegal per se unless the
plaintiff proved that the combination was plainly anticompetitive and
without substantial and procompetitive efficiency justifications."° It
is much more difficult for plaintiffs to meet Broadcast Music's burden
of proof because they must do more than show a mere theoretical
or possible effect on price competition.'20
To the degree that plaintiffs must show more before they can
prove "per se price fixing," the practical significance of the per se rule's
preclusionary effect 2 is diminished. Although defendants are still
precluded from justifying conduct once it is deemed illegal per se,
Justice White's economic efficiency-oriented per se standard allows
them to escape per se illegality by permitting defenses heretofore
unallowed. °3 Thus, the per se rule's preclusionary effect is reduced,
not because any procompetitive justifications will be allowed after a
per se violation is found, but because the Broadcast Music per se stan-
dard allows such justifications to be made before that per se
characterization is made. 4
Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion is perhaps the most intrigu-
ing and enigmatic portion of the Broadcast Music opinion.
Characteristically, Justice Stevens did not address the per se issue
and would therefore not be allowed as an "ancillary restraint." See R. BORK, supra
note 4, at 262-79.
198. The Court did not provide a standard for evaluating such agreements under
a Rule of Reason analysis; this omission has made application of Broadcast Music's
new per se standard somewhat confusing. See ANTITRUST ADVISOR supra note 24, S1.29
at 12, 13, 16.
199. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
200. Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2485. Justice Powell dissented, believing
that this higher burden of proof was not met. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority,
used a less stringent burden of proof and held that the plaintiffs had met their burden.
201. Under the Socony-Vacuum per se standard, plaintiffs often were awarded
damages merely by showing that harm to market price structure was theoretically
possible. Handler, supra note 104, at 983.
202. See supra note 16.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 191-94.
204. Socony-Vacuum's per se standard prohibited defendants from raising
defenses such as "efficiency-creating potential" during the per se characterization process.
See supra text accompanying notes 191-94.
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in terms of economic efficiency or restriction of output."' Instead he
summarily cited his support of the majority's refusal to find a per
se violation of the Sherman Act. 6 The Justice explained in some detail
why the non-exclusive nature of BMI's and ASCAP's blanket license
differentiated their license from those licenses found illegal per se in
a block-booking or blanket license context."7 As to his reasons for
not finding a per se illegal price fix in the case at bar, Justice Stevens
implied that the availability of an altered blanket license as an
appropriate remedy'" precluded a finding of a plainly anticompetitive
arrangement.2"9 It would appear, however, that Justice Stevens could
have found the defendants' blanket licenses to constitute "per se price
fixing" - his dissenting opinion stated that the blanket license could
possibly produce a deleterious effect on competition between
composers.2"' Presumably, had he desired, the Justice could have ex-
pounded upon the court of appeals' rationale and justified a per se
characterization in Broadcast Music based on the analysis used in
Socony- Vacuum.2"'
The unique facts of Broadcast Music may best explain why
Justice Stevens failed to apply Socony-Vacuum to find a "per se price
fix." The lack of an adequate remedy given the market structure of
the copyright industry may have been a primary reason for not
applying the per se rule.2"2 Since a blanket license in some form (i.e.,
per use) is an adequate remedy, and indeed, seems by far the most
effective remedy, any decision proclaiming that license to be illegal
per se would almost assuredly do more harm to the industry (and
general public) than good. Moreover, the Justice Department and the
Congress had already approved blanket licenses," 3 as Justice White
acknowledged several times in his opinion. There was also no
guarantee that any benefits generated by increased competition among
205. Such an approach is characteristic of Justice Stevens, given his Profes-
sional Eng'rs' opinion. See supra notes 146-151 and accompanying text.
206. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 25-26.
207. Id. at 28-33.
208. The Justice suggested that a blanket license based on actual usage of
compositions might be a reasonable restraint of trade, thereby echoing the court of
appeals' position. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 30-34. See also supra note 171.
209. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 25-26.
210. Id. at 32.
211. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
212. Judge Posner & Professor Easterbrook suggest that this factor may have
been a consideration in Broadcast Music. R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 136,
at 212-15. Professor Easterbrook argued the Broadcast Music case before the Court
on behalf of the government. See also Sullivan & Wiley, supra note 141, at 335-36.
213. See Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 10-15.
1984] 1043
De Grasse: Maricopa County and the Problem of Per Se Characterization in Hor
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1984
VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18
composers as a result of a per se finding would be passed on to
consumers. 21' Thus, Broadcast Music's unique facts justify Justice
Stevens refusal to declare the blanket licenses illegal per se. At the
same time, Justice Stevens' failure to adopt the language of GTE
Sylvania, his stated apprehension of centralized economic power,211 and
the unique facts of Broadcast Music suggested that he might be recep-
tive to finding a per se violation in future instances.216
Broadcast Music raised many questions regarding the Court's per
se price fixing characterization process. The case's comprehensive and
candid description of the characterization process was highly unusual,
given past Court opinions. Justice White's new standard for per se
characterization was nothing short of a revolution in the Court's
analytical process in this area. This new per se characterization stan-
dard simultaneously altered the price fixing per se process, raised the
plaintiff's burden of proof, and reduced the per se rule's preclusionary
effect.
Justice White's new per se standard also significantly restricted
the scope of the per se price fixing rule and generated a per se
characterization process which was more comprehensive, time-
consuming and costly than Socony-Vacuum's characterization analysis.
In light of the many changes rendered by this opinion, even those
scholars who erroneously interpreted Professional Engineers as
creating an expedited Rule of Reason analysis acknowledged some dif-
ficulty in squaring that case with Broadcast Music."1 7 However, the
unusual factual context presented in Broadcast Music provided a con-
venient justification for limiting the case to its facts. Justice Stevens,
the lone dissenter in that case, eventually took advantage of this
opportunity three years later to severely limit Broadcast Music with
his majority opinion in Maricopa County.
VI. MARICOPA COUNTY: THE FINAL WORD
The Court's commitment to a per se characterization process
based on "efficiency-creating" potential has been called into question
on several occasions since Broadcast Music"8 Catalano, Inc. v. Target
214. See Sullivan & Wiley, supra note 141, at 335-36.
215. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 37.
216. Justice Stevens' expression of support for decentralizing economic power
is important, for it is advocated by proponents of Harvard School theory and indicates
that Justice Stevens favors that school's antitrust ideology. See supra note 4.
217. Sullivan & Wiley, supra note 141, at 333-34 (Professional Eng'rs' Rule of
Reason analysis, as described in Broadcast Music, perhaps was rejected by majority
due to latter case's unique facts).
218. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466 (1982);
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Sales, Inc.2"9 was the first decision to limit the far-ranging dicta of
Justice White."' Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society"' con-
firmed commentators' suspicions that the Court might extend Catalano
and severely limit the scope and precedential value of Broadcast Music
A. The Factual Context of Maricopa County
The Maricopa County Medical Society.. organized the Maricopa
Foundation for Medical Care (FMC) in order to make available a type
Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980).
219. Id
220. In Catalano, a group of beer wholesalers made a secret agreement to
eliminate interest-free credit to beer retailers. Catalano, 446 U.S. at 644. The retailers
brought a suit against the combination, arguing that the wholesalers' agreement con-
stituted a "price fix" and was therefore in violation of S 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 643.
The district court denied the petitioner's motion to declare the wholesaler's
arrangement illegal per se. Id. at 643-44. However, since the per se status of an agree-
ment fixing credit terms was a controlling question of law to which there was substantial
ground for difference, the district judge certified this per se characterization issue
to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1292(b). Id.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's denial and the Supreme Court subse-
quently granted certiorari. Id.
The Court, per curiam, found this agreement to fix credit terms to be illegal
per se. Curiously, the opinion referred to both the per se characterization dicta of Socony-
Vacuum and to Justice Powell's "no redeeming value" test of GTE Sylvania. See id.
at 647-49. However, the Court applied Socony-Vacuum's per se standard in deciding
the case and consequently characterized the wholesaler agreement as illegal per se because
it affected price competition among beer distributors. See id. at 649.
The Court's preference for Socony-Vacuum's per se standard was significant
because the Justices could have condemned the agreement as illegal per se pursuant
to Broadcast Music's per se standard had they chosen to do so. For instance, Professor
Liebeler has argued that the agreement between wholesalers involved no integration
of productive facilities and consequently did not provide any efficiency-creating
integration to which the fix on credit terms could have been ancillary. Thus, the agree-
ment could have been found illegal per se under the per se characterization standard
articulated by Judge Bork and adopted by the Court in Broadcast Music. Professor
Liebeler advocates the use of this economically-oriented standard. ANTITRUST ADVISOR.
supra note 24, S 1.29 at 17.
Some observers interpreted the Court's use of the Socony-Vacuum standard as
a refutation of Broadcast Music and a return to the analytical rigidity which dominated
the Court's decisions prior to GTE Sylvania. See, e.g., ANTITRUST ADVISOR, supra note
24, S 1.29 at 17. However, by acknowledging that only those agreements which were
plainly anticompetitive and possessed "no apparent potentially redeeming value" were
to be found illegal per se, the Court left open the possibility that Catalano would later
be interpreted as being entirely consistent with Broadcast Music. See, e.g., Maricopa
County, 102 S. Ct. 2483. (Powell, J., dissenting) (Catalano consistent with Broadcast
Music- both support notion that only plainly anti-competitive agreements were illegal
per se).
221. 102 S. Ct. 2466 (1982).
222. The Pima County Medical Society organized a similar foundation and was
originally joined as a party to the lawsuit, but was later dismissed from the suit under
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of prepaid insurance plan.223 The foundation was composed of approx-
imately 1750 physicians... and performed several essential services,
a consent order. Maricopa County, 643 F.2d 553, 554 n.2 (1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 2466
(1982).
223. Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2470-71, 2480. Foundations for Medical Care
(FMC's) are of relatively recent origin. See Maricopa County, 643 F.2d at 554 (1980).
Medical societies, largely due to public pressure, have created these foundations in
an effort to halt the rapid increase in health costs. Havighurst, Professional Restraints
on Innovation in Health Care Financing, 1978 DUKE L.J. 303, 315-25 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Havighurst, Health Care Financing]. Medical societies argue that FMC's lower
the costs of health care by providing "peer review," a procedure by which the founda-
tions review the medical necessity and appropriateness of treatment rendered by foun-
dation members to persons insured under a foundation plan. See Maricopa County,
102 S. Ct. at 2471; 562 F.2d at 555. FMC's have been the subject of controversy,
however-many experts believe the organizations are designed by the medical profes-
sion merely to eliminate any alternative means for financing health care. Havighurst,
Health Care Financing, supra at 315-16. For a more comprehensive description and
discussion of FMC's, see C. STEINWALD, AN INTRODUCTION To FOUNDATIONS FOR MEDICAL
CARE (1971).
A viable alternative to FMC's that is disapproved of by medical societies but
which may reduce health costs is the "closed panel prepaid health insurance plan,"
better known as a "health maintenance organization" (HMO). Id. at 304-05. See also
Kissam, Health Maintenance Organizations and the Role of Anti-trust Law, 1978 DUKE
L.J. 487 (1978). Under an HMO form of health plan, the consumer pays a fixed periodic
fee to a functionally integrated panel of doctors in exchange for the latters' promise
to provide any medical services the subscriber might desire during the course of the
insured term. Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2470 n.7. Under this plan, doctors bear
the economic risks associated with health care and are thereby encouraged to provide
only those medical services necessary and to instigate cost-effective treatment and
procedure. For a comprehensive listing of the advantages and disadvantages of 79HMO's,
see Havighurst, Health Maintenance Organizations and the Market for Health Services,
35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 716, 720-24 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Havighurst, HMO's].
Critics of the medical profession charge that FMC's violate antitrust laws by
detering HMO's from entering the market. These critics contend that FMC's bar the
entry of HMO's into the market by "limit-pricing" foundation services. According to
this theory, FMC's charge a lower price than what could be obtained by them, but
still higher than what they could obtain in a purely competitive market where price
would equal marginal cost. FMC's fix a price level low enough to prevent smaller
competitors (like HMO's) from making enough revenue to overcome operating cost,
with the differing economies of scale explaining the differing cost curves of the two
organizations. For a short discussion of this theory and criticisms of it, see Maricopa
County, 562 F.2d at 558. See also Havighurst, HMO's, supra at 767-77; Havighurst, Health
Care Financing, supra at 377-81. But see Markovits, Potential Competition, Limit Price
Theory, and the Legality of Horizontal and Conglomerate Mergers Under the American
Anti-trust Laws, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 658 (1975). Justice Stevens apparently had this "limit
price" theory in mind when he wrote the majority opinion in Maricopa County: "[In
this case the [per se] rule is violated by a price restraint that . . . may discourage
entry into the market and may deter experimentation and new development." 102
S. Ct. at 2475.
224. This number comprised 70% of all the practitioners in Maricopa County.
Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2470.
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including peer review225 and the setting of maximum fees.226 These fees
set a limit on the amount foundation members could charge patients
who were insured under a foundation-approved health care plan.
Foundation members voted on whether to accept the proposed max-
imum fee schedule.228 Periodically, the FMC's Board of Trustees revised
the fee schedule and submitted the revised schedule to members for
a vote.229
The foundation did not insure risks itself,232 but instead solicited
private insurance companies to offer medical insurance policies based
upon the established fee schedules.23 ' The insureds were guaranteed
complete reimbursement for the full amount of their medical bills if
they chose physicians who were foundation members. 32 An insured
was free to consult a non-foundation member, but he was not reim-
bursed for charges that exceeded the maximum fee schedules
established by the foundation.2 33 In exchange for limiting their fees,
foundation members were guaranteed full reimbursement for those
charges not exceeding the fee schedule limits.234 However, members
were permitted to treat patients not insured under a foundation-
sponsored plan and charge whatever fee they desired in such
instances.23
The State of Arizona brought a civil suit against the Maricopa
FMC alleging that the organization violated 1 of the Sherman Act
by establishing the maximum fee schedule.236 The plaintiff moved for
partial summary judgment, urging the Court to declare the setting
of maximum fees to be illegal per se pursuant to Socony-Vacuum1
3
The district court denied the state's motion2 3' but certified the ques-
225. See supra note 223.
226. Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2470-71.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 2470.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 2480. The foundation was a not-for-profit corporation licensed merely
an "insurance administrator" -it did not underwrite insurance policies. See id. at 2471
& n.11.
231. Id. at 2480-81. Seven insurance companies underwrote insurance policies
for the Maricopa FMC. Id. at 2471 n.11.
232. Id. at 2471-72.
233. Id. at 2472. Insureds were thus free to choose any physician they desired.
234. Id. at 2471.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 2469.
237. Maricopa County, 643 F.2d at 557. Note that Maricopa County's procedural
background is similar to that found in Catalano. See supra note 220 and accompaning
text.
238. Maricopa County,102 S. Ct. at 2469. The district court noted a recent trend
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tion of whether the foundation's fee setting arrangement was illegal
per se under S 1 of the Sherman Act."9
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's denial.24 The
appellate court concluded that the record was too sparse and the
judiciary's experience in the field of health care too limited to permit
a finding of per se illegality.241 The circuit court wanted more infor-
mation regarding the maximum fee schedule at issue and the health
care industry in general before evaluating the procompetitive justifica-
tions for the fee setting. 42 The appellate court's analysis was consis-
tent with the per se standard used in Broadcast Music to determine
whether a contested activity or agreement was illegal per se:243 the
circuit court looked to whether the agreement in question generated
to prefer a Rule of Reason analysis over a per se characterization and cited GTE Sylvania
to support this assertion. Id. at 2469 n.2.
239. Id. at 2469.
240. Maricopa County, 643 F.2d 553 (1980). However, as Justice Stevens noted,
each circuit judge had his own reasons for holding as he did. Maricopa County, 102
S. Ct. at 2469-70.
241. Maricopa County, 643 F.2d 556-60.
[Tihe record reveals nothing about the actual competitive effects of the
challenged arrangement nor do the authorities
afford assurance concerning its competitive impact. In truth, we know
very little about this and many other arrangements within the health care
industry. This alone should make us reluctant to invoke a per se rule....
Id. at 556.
242. Id. Judge Sneed cited the court's lack of knowledge regarding the nature
of FMC's and HMO's, and its lack of knowledge regarding their relationship to each
other, as primary reasons why the pro- and anticompetitive impact of the FMC's max-
imum fee schedule could not be properly evaluated. The judge considered a per se
characterization unwise given the court's lack of expertise in this area. Id. at 558.
243. See supra note 242 and accompanying text. However, while the appellate
court opinion did cite Broadcast Music for support, the court did not mention the con-
cept of efficiency-creating potential (resulting from integration) that was central to
the Broadcast Music holding. Instead, the appellate court interpreted Broadcast Music
as requiring a balancing of pro- and anticompetitive effects in both per se and Rule
of Reason analyses. Maricopa County, 643 F.2d at 558. This interpretation is misleading
as it suggests that the per se and Rule of Reason processes are largely repetitive
in cases of difficult characterization. Indeed, a respected commentator has reached
that same conclusion after analyzing Broadcast Music. See Sullivan & Wiley, supra
note 141, at 332-33.
The appellate court's misinterpretation is due to the failure of the Court in Broad-
cast Music to articulate a clear standard for the Rule of Reason analysis and properly
distinguish that analysis from the per se characterization process. See ANTITRUST AD-
VISOR, supra note 24, S 1.29, at 12, 13, 16 (Court's failure to provide standards for
distinguishing between per se and Rule of Reason analyses results in cases like Maricopa
County and Catalano). Cf. Taylor, supra note 16, at 186 (Maricopa County illustrates
difficulty of distinguishing between Rule of Reason and per se cases).
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substantial economic efficiencies which were unattainable in the
absence of the agreement.244 Unable to determine whether any
economic efficiencies resulted from the foundation's setting of max-
imum fees, the court of appeals refused to establish per se illegality
because it could not be certain that the agreement was plainly anti-
competitive and without redeeming virtue.
2 45
The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari. 24 As in
Catalano, the Court was required to assume that the respondent-FMC's
statement of facts was true. 7 The court, per Justice Stevens, reversed
the court of appeals and held 48 that the foundation's establishing of
a maximum fee schedule by a polling of those who were to collect
the fixed fees was "per se price fixing," and, therefore, violated 5 1 of
the Sherman Act.2 49 Justice Powell wrote a vigorous dissent joined
by Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger.
2
'5
B. The Significance of Maricopa County
There are four reasons why Maricopa County is a significant deci-
sion. First, the case indicated that the Court's supposed preference
for a Rule of Reason (vs. per se) analysis is probably at an end.251
Second, Justice Stevens' opinion relied heavily on Socony-Vacuum
rather than on Broadcast Music and the latter's economically-oriented
characterization analysis.252 Maricopa County further reduces the scope
and precedential value of Broadcast Music- a reduction which began
with Catalano.2" Third, unlike Professional Engineers, Broadcast Music
244. See supra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
245. See Maricopa County, 643 F.2d at 556-60.
246. Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2469.
247. Id.
248. Maricopa County was a 4-3 decision. Justices Blackman and O'Connor did
not participate in the case's decision. Justice Stevens was joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and White.
249. Id. at 2480.
250. Id
251. Recall that the district court identified a trend favoring the more com-
prehensive Rule of Reason analysis and cited GTE Sylvania for support. See supra
note 238. The GTE Sylvania and Broadcast Music decisions, along with an erroneous
interpretation of Professional Eng'rs as a Rule of Reason case, suggested a judicial
tendency to prefer Rule of Reason over per se analysis. See supra note 240. See also
L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2 at 322; Robinson, supra note 46, at 14; Handler, supra note
46, at 983.
252. Terms such as "efficiency-creating potential," "integration" and "plainly
anticompetitive without any potentially redeeming virtue" were not in the majority
opinion. See infra notes 263-67 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 220.
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and Catalano, Maricopa County contains a vigorous dissent which
reveals deep dissention within the Court regarding the proper scope
and nature of the per se characterization process.254 Fourth, Justice
Stevens' opinion contains some of the same inconsistencies which were
evident in his Professional Engineers majority opinion. 5' The Maricopa
County decision has several other important implications for antitrust
law, but these considerations are outside the scope of this discussion.su
1. Predominance of the per se rule?
Maricopa County perhaps signals the end of the Burger Court's
preference for the more comprehensive Rule of Reason analysis over
the simplicity and expeditiousness of the per se rule.?7 While denying
Arizona's motion for summary judgment, the circuit court noted that
it could declare the FMC's fee schedule to be illegal per se at a later
date.25 1 The Supreme Court undoubtedly realized that an affirmation
254. See infra note 318-44 and accompanying text.
255. After advocating an expedited and cursory per se characterization pro-
cess, Justice Stevens seems to apply a truncated Rule of Reason analysis to Maricopa
County's factual context. See Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2477-80. See also infra
notes 282-87 and accompanying text.
256. Several commentators have suggested that Maricopa County revitalizes
the Albrecht and Kiefer-Stewart holdings by confining GTE Sylvania's prohibition of
per se illegality to only vertical non-price restraints. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 16,
at 190-91. Following GTE Sylvania, several courts extended the ban on per se illegality
to prevent the characterization of vertical price restraints as illegal per se. See, e.g.,
Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 638 F.2d 15 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 324 (1981); In Re Nissan, 577 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1072 (1979).
More important, Justice Stevens in Maricopa County apparently abandoned the
simplified Rule of Reason standard he applied in Professional Eng'rs which looked to
whether the contested agreement suppressed or promoted competition. Professional
Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 691. See also supra text accompanying notes 133-140. Instead, the
Justice applied the standard formulated by Justice Powell in GTE Sylvania which
required the fact-finder to "weigh all of the circumstances of a case" in deciding whether
to declare a restrictive practice to be an unreasonable restraint on competition. See
Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2472; GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 49.
Finally, Maricopa County appears to have further narrowed the antitrust exception
for professional societies. See Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2475-76. See also Note,
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society: Supreme Court Refuses to Immunize Doc-
tors Against Sting of Sherman Act Section 1, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 1203 (1983).
257. See supra note 251.
258. Judge Kennedy addressed this point in his concurring opinion:
This is not to suggest, however, that I have found these reimbursement
schedules to be per se proper, that an examination of these practices under
the rule of reason at trial will not reveal the proscribed adverse effect
on competition, or that this court is foreclosed at some later date, when
it has more evidence, from concluding that such schedules do constitute
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of the ninth circuit's opinion would similarly allow it to declare the
fee schedule illegal per se in the future. Indeed, Justice Powell men-
tioned this consideration in arguing for affirmance of the appellate
court decision.25 9 Thus, the Court had ample justification for affirm-
ing the lower courts' denials of summary judgment.6 ° However, Justice
Stevens unequivocally stated that the per se price fixing standard did
not allow for any consideration of procompetitive justifications
whatsoever.26 ' Given the meager record and lack of judicial experience
in this case, the Court's granting of summary judgment can be inter-
preted as a rejuvenation of the per se price fixing rule-a rejuvena-
tion which began with Catalano.262
2. Revitalization of Socony-Vacuum and repudiation of
Broadcast Music
Maricopa County's foremost contribution to contemporary anti-
trust doctrine is its resounding rejection of the FMC's procompetitive
justifications for the fee schedule. The majority believed that the max-
imum fee schedule's purported creation of otherwise unattainable
efficiencies was an irrelevant factor. 263 Quoting Socony-Vacuum at
length, Justice Stevens held that " '[w]hatever economic justification
particular price agreements may . . . have . . . [t]hey are all banned.' ",264
The FMC's fee schedule tampered with price structure (and therefore
violated the per se rule) because it "tend[ed] to provide the same
economic rewards to all practitioners regardless of their skill, their
experience, their training, or their willingness to employ innovative
and difficult procedures .... ",265 Thus, even though the fee schedule
may have saved consumers millions of dollars, Justice Stevens dis-
missed the FMC's procompetitive justifications for the schedule
per se violations. The evidence adduced at trial may very well show that
the theories which Judge Sneed refutes in the abstract do have an
empirical foundation and that the challenged practices have the proscrib-
ed effect of suppressing rather than promoting competition.
Id. at 560.
259. See Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2485 n.13 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice
Powell advocated further review of the fee schedule's efficiency-creating potential.
260. See id.
261. Id. at 2477. (foundation's claim of procompetitive justifications as defense to
per se illegality indicates a misunderstanding of the per se concept).
262. See supra note 220.
263. Indeed, given Maricopa County's procedural posture, the Court was required
to assume that the FMC's fee schedule saved consumers millions of dollars. Maricopa
County, 102 S. Ct. at 2472, 2481.
264. Id. at 2477 n.23 (quoting Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 224 n.59).
265. Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2475.
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because Socony-Vacuum demanded that any agreement tampering with
price structure be banned due to the anticompetitive potential inherent
in all "price fixes." '66 Maricopa County's revitalization of the Socony-
Vacuum per se standard27 is significant because this revitalization
represents a repudiation of the per se characterization standard found
in Broadcast Music. 268
266. See id. at 2477. Justice Stevens' repudiation of "efficiency-creating poten-
tial" and his reaffirmation of Socony-Vacuum's rigid "price-tampering" per se standard
suggest that a per se characterization analysis based upon economic analysis has
presently lost favor with the Court. Indeed, in applying Albrecht's prohibition of ver-
tical maximum price restraints to the horizontal market structure found in Maricopa
County, Justice Stevens admitted that maximum and minimum prices were not
economically equivalent. 102 S. Ct. at 2475. The Justice proceeded to dismiss this
economic distinction as irrelevant, commenting that since both affected price levels
they were legally equivalent, i.e., illegal per se. Id.
Moreover, factors such as barriers to entry, restrictions on freedom to charge whatever
price one desires in a free market, and the substitution of sellers' judgment regarding
price levels for market forces replaced "efficiency creating potential" as primary con-
siderations in Maricopa County's per se characterization analysis. Id. at 2474-75. For
example, contract integrations which created otherwise unattainable economic efficiencies
and relieved an agreement of per se illegality under Broadcast Music's dictate resulted
in increased barriers to entry or decreased freedom for individual businessmen. By
allowing vertical territorial and customer restrictions in GTE Sylvania, the Court sanc-
tioned the restriction of individual retailers' freedom to compete wherever they wish-
ed and to sell to whomever they wished. However, the Court recognized that such
a restriction on individuals' freedom was ancillary to the legitimate end of promoting
efficient franchise systems. See GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54-56 (discussion of numerous
efficiencies created in product distribution through vertical non-price restraints). Cf.
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, where the Court rejected a similar defense of
efficiencies created through the imposition of a maximum price in a vertical market
structure. The Court in Albrecht rejected this defense by citing Socony-Vacuum, and
Maricopa County seems to follow Albrecht's analysis. See supra note 256. See also supra
note 70.
Maricopa County suggests that these efficiency-creating integrations may be
declared illegal per se. The Court undoubtedly was aware that medical professions
had been accused of establishing FMC's as barriers to prevent HMO's from entering
the health care market. See supra note 19. Professor Liebeler, arguing from a Chicago
School viewpoint, discussed the Maricopa County plaintiffs "price-limiting" theory as
irrelevant, stating that this barrier to HMO's merely resulted from the increased efficiency
in services provided by FMC's. See ANTITRUST ADVISOR supra note 24, 5 1.29 at 20.
267. The Court quoted Socony-Vacuum at length several times in the opinion,
including that langauge forbidding "any combination which tampers with price struc-
tures" and those combinations "formed for the purpose of raising, depressing, fixing,
pegging or stabilizing the price of a commodity." Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2474
(quoting Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 213, 221-22).
268. The Justice conducted an elaborate historical analysis of the per se rule
which relied heavily on a handful of cases which had been implicitly rejected in GTE
Sylvania as being based on "formalistic line drawing" rather than "demonstrable
economic effect." See Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2473-75 (citing Trenton Potteries,
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Justice Stevens attempted to distinguish Broadcast Music from
Maricopa County so that the latter's rigid "price tampering" per se
standard would be seen as the authoritative per se characterization
test. Justice Stevens postulated that the blanket license sold by
ASCAP and BMI in Broadcast Music was a "different product" than
the license sold by individual composers. Therefore, ASCAP and BMI
were not joint sales agencies offering the individual products of many
competitors, but separate competitors in their own right offering their
own blanket licenses, "of which the [competing composers'] individual
compositions [were the] raw material." '269 Justice Stevens held that no
such different product was created by the FMC's existence in
Maricopa County!"7 The Justice noted that the medical services offered
by doctors to patients insured under the FMC-sponsored plan were
no different in nature than the services rendered to consumers who
did not partake in this plan.27' The integration of doctors merely pro-
vided for lower market prices due to reduced transaction costs and
did not create a "different product. '27 2 Thus, Broadcast Music and
Maricopa County were distinguishable on their facts.
However, Justice Powell asserted in his dissent that to
characterize the doctors in Maricopa County as horizontal competitors
while somehow distinguishing the composers in Broadcast Music as
competitors of a "different product" was a specious differentiation
which failed to adequately distinguish the two cases.2 3 The contested
activity in both cases involved competitors who reduced transaction
273 U.S. 392, Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. 150, Albrecht, 390 U.S. 145 and Kiefer-Stewart,
340 U.S. 211). Neither GTE Sylvania nor Broadcast Music was included in the Court's
historical account of the per se rule's development. Such an omission was surely not
inadvertant for these two cases were landmark decisions which adopted for the first
time the Chicago School notion of "efficiency-creating potential." Rather, the conspicuous
omission of GTE Sylvania and Broadcast Music from Maricopa County's historical seg-
ment and the Court's infrequent citation to them in its opinion amounted to a rejec-
tion of the Chicago School theory upon which the former cases rested. In short, the
Court in Maricopa County adopted a per se price fixing standard far different from
that stipulated in Broadcast Music. For further discussion of the differences between
the per se standards formulated in Broadcast Music and Socony-Vacuum, see infra note
292.
269. Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2479 n.31 (quoting Broadcast Music, 441
U.S. at 22). Thus, the composers were not seen as the competitors at issue in Broad-
cast Music-the clearinghouses themselves were the relevant competitors. Since no
agreement to fix prices existed between the clearinghouses, no price restraint existed
among competitors.
270. Id. at 2479 & n.33.
271. See id.
272. Id.
273. See id. at 2483-84.
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costs and provided substantial procompetitive efficiencies through
cooperative pricing. 74 Justice Powell claimed that the "new product"
made in Broadcast Music was "made" through the reaping of "other-
wise unattainable efficiencies."2"' He concluded that the FMC in
Maricopa County provided a different product "to precisely the same
extent as did Broadcast Music's clearinghouses."2 6
Justice Powell's refutation of the majority's "different product"
theory for distinguishing Broadcast Music effectively denies the
existence of a different product in either case. The Justice's asser-
tion that both agreements created a "different product" to the same
extent was correct 77- neither agreement created such a product. The
blanket license in Broadcast Music gave licensees immediate access
to millions of compositions for unlimited usage during a fixed period
of time. Yet, the licensees could have obtained the same results
through separate negotiations with the individual copyright holders.
Thus, the integration of the composers' marketing and selling
resources did not alter the product they sold, but merely lowered the
cost of acquiring their products individually. This lower "transaction
cost" thereby facilitated widespread use of many different
compositions.278 The integration did not create a "different product."
Unfortunately, Justice Powell did not reject the use of this legal fic-
tion as a factor in per se characterization analysis, but asserted that
a "new product" also existed in Maricopa County.279 Antitrust law
would be better served if this misleading concept were rejected at
the next available opportunity.2"'
274. Id. at 2483-85 & nn.12-13. Moreover, the foundation plan created incen-
tives to cut down on costs by substituting the weak cost containment incentives of
"usual, customary and reasonable"ee-for-service plans with the stronger cost control
mechanism of maximum fee schedules. Id.
275. Id. at 2484.
276. Id. at 2484 n.12.
277. Id.
278. See Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 20. Professor Sullivan summarized this
concept in a passage written two years before Broadcast Music was decided: "A joint
selling agent does not merely set joint prices for firms which previously competed
as to price; it also performs in an integrated manner, functions which the firms had
previously performed independently." L. SULLIVAN supra note 2, §77 at 208. By
substituting the word "composer" for "firms," one obtains an accurate description of
how ASCAP created economic efficiency: it reduced transaction costs by integrating
functions such as selling, marketing, and copyright enforcement. Composers had per-
formed these functions independently prior to 1914. See Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at
20. Note that Professor Sullivan says nothing about a "different product" being created.
279. Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2484.
280. The "different product" theory was probably created to appease those
Justices who could not bring themselves to approve a price fix which affected price
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Justice Stevens failed in his effort to persuasively distinguish
Maricopa County from Broadcast Music. The latter case hinders the
Justice's attempt to create an ironclad prohibition of price-fixing based
on a Socony-Vacuum "price tampering" per se standard. Broadcast
Music's refusal to declare a literal price fix illegal per se simply can-
not be squared with Maricopa County's per se prohibition of all
agreements restricting price competition- unless one makes the rather
reasonable assumption that Maricopa County is a de facto overruling
of Broadcast Music.
28 1
3. The internal inconsistency within Maricopa County
The force and persuasiveness of Maricopa County is further
undermined by the internally inconsistent per se characterization
analysis undertaken by the majority in that case. Justice Stevens
emphatically rejected as immaterial any procompetitive justifications
for the fee schedule and instead focused on the fee schedule's effect
on the market price structure. However, he simultaneously conducted
a truncated Rule of Reason analysis to reach conclusions which
bolstered his finding of per se illegality."2
The inconsistency of such a per se characterization analysis is
readily apparent from a reading of the majority opinion. Justice
Stevens stated the now familiar rule that all tamperings with price
are illegal per se, even if some might be found reasonable under a
Rule of Reason analysis - procompetitive justifications were irrele-
vant once a per se illegal "price fix" was found. Yet even though he
competition among approximately 52,000 competitors. The use of this legal fiction was
necessary to overcome what Justice Powell condemned as "formalistic line drawing"
in GTE Sylvania. SeeGTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 58-59. The fiction certainly was not
necessary to the Broadcast Music holding; under the Chicago School theory adopted
by the Court in that case, competitors' restriction of price competition is irrelevant
to a per se characterization analysis. Instead, the analysis focuses on whether the com-
bination formed is designed to produce substantial economic efficiencies unattainable
in the absence of an agreement. Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2482. In short, any
distinctions between "competitors" and "non-competitors" and "indirect" and "direct"
price restrictions are considered irrelevant in Broadcast Music's per se characteriza-
tion process. The emphasis is on efficiency and "demonstrable economic effect," not
on "formalistic line drawing."
281. Justice Powell concluded that Justice Stevens had effectively overruled
Broadcast Music. See Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2483-85.
282. Id. at 2477-80. This practice of formulating one standard of per se
characterization while applying a different standard is not a new phenomenon in Supreme
Court cases. A similar approach was taken in Professional Eng'rs. For a discussion
regarding the confusion generated in the legal community as a result of this inconsis-
tent approach to per se characterization, see supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
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found the FMC's fee schedule to be illegal per se and accordingly
rejected the FMC's procompetitive justifications for the schedule,
Justice Stevens nevertheless evaluated these justifications in order
to illustrate their lack of merit:
Those claims of enhanced competition are so unlikely to
prove significant in any particular case that we adhere to
the [per se] rule that is justified in its general application.
Even when respondents are given every benefit of the
doubt, the limited record in this case is not inconsistent
with the presumption that the respondent['s] agreements
will not significantly enhance competition.283
However, such an evaluation was unnecessary given Justice Stevens'
application of a rigid per se characterization standard based on Socony-
Vacuum. Even if the fee schedule did enhance competition, the anti-
competitive potential inherent in all price fixes mandated that the
fee schedule's maximum prices be conclusively presumed illegal per
se.
28 4
The truncated Rule of Reason analysis performed by Justice
Stevens undermines whatever persuasiveness and appeal the reader
might find in the mechanical and formal per se characterization analysis
described in Maricopa County.' One must wonder whether lower court
283. Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2477.
284. See id. at 2473, 2477.
285. Moreover, some of the logic used to rebut a showing of procompetitive
effects is suspect. For instance, at one point Justice Stevens noted that the FMC health
care plan would provide only as much guarantee of full payment for bills as would
a medical care plan providing for payment of all "usual, customary and reasonable"
fees. Id. Justice Stevens arrived at this conclusion by calculating the percentage of
cases in which insurers pay for the insured's entire medical bill under the "usual,
customary" plan, and compared this percentage to the percentage of physicians who
were members of the Maricopa FMC. Since the percentages were the same (i.e., 70%,
Justice Stevens presumed that in either case, a patient had a 70% chance of getting
all medical costs reimbursed. Id. This reasoning assumes that insureds in a FMC-
sponsored plan had a 70% likelihood of receiving medical services from a consulting
member. However, it seems very likely that any person who would join the FMC-
sponsored plan would do so in order to rid himself of doubts as to whether the in-
surer would pay for all his medical bills under the "usual, customary and reasonable"
plan. This being the case, it seems probable that he would not seek medical service
from a physician who was not a Maricopa foundation member, and it is likely that
an insured in a foundation-sponsored plan had a better than 70% chance of having
his entire medical bill paid for, as compared to the lower 70% figure cited for those
insureds covered under a normal "usual, customary, and reasonable" insurance plan.
The many presumptions and inferences made by Justice Stevens in evaluating
the respondent's procompetitive justifications all appear to favor the petitioner. These
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judges will be able to apply Maricopa County's rigid per se
characterization standard in cases involving difficult characterization
problems, since the Court itself could not apply the standard in
Maricopa County's relatively simple factual context without butress-
ing its holding by use of a truncated Rule of Reason analysis. 8 The
Justice's use of two seemingly contradictory per se characterization
processes in Maricopa County is likely to generate as much confusion
as his Professional Engineers opinion did in this regard.287
In fairness to Justice Stevens, there may be a plausible explana-
tion for his seemingly contradictory approach. Presumably, the Justice
recognized that not all price fixes are illegal per se: he refused to
declare ASCAP's blanket license illegal per se in Broadcast Music.288
He distinguished Broadcast Music from Maricopa County by noting
that FMC's were not analagous to "other joint arrangements in which
persons who would otherwise be competitors pool their capital and
share the risks of loss as well as the opportunities for profit."2" Justice
Stevens also pointed to the creation of a "different product" in Broad-
cast Music."9 Justice Stevens' admission that certain arrangements
may escape per se illegality through a sharing of risks, losses, and
profits, combined with his belief that ASCAP's blanket license was
not illegal per se, effectively create an exception to his Maricopa Coun-
ty per se characterization standard. Those agreements which are ac-
presumptions seem to be inconsistent with the procedural context in which the case
is set. Given that the petitioner was requesting summary judgment, the Court was
obligated to accept the respondent's facts as true and make references and presump-
tions giving the respondent the benefit of the doubt. Justice Powell took note of this
inconsistency in his dissent. See id. at 2482.
286. The characterization of the Maricopa FMC's fee schedule as illegal per
se should have been relatively easy under the majority's reasoning, given the fact
that the schedule rather blatantly and directly fixed prices.
Of course, had the fee schedule's economic efficiencies, the uniqueness of the
professional health care industry, and the judiciary's lack of experience all been given
weight by the Court, Maricopa County would have presented a much more complex
and difficult characterization problem, as evidenced by Justice Powell's and Judge
Sneed's desire to remand the case for further findings of fact.
287. See supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text. However, in contrast to
his Professional Eng'rs opinion, Justice Stevens did make it clear in Maricopa County
that the Court was applying the per se rule. See Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2475.
288. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 25. In Maricopa County, Justice Powell went
so far as to quote that part of Justice Stevens' Broadcast Music dissent in which the
latter unequivocally supported the majority's refusal to find per se illegality. Maricopa
County, 102 S. Ct. at 2483 n.7 (quoting Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 25).
289. Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2479-80.
290. Id. However, this "different product" distinction is without merit, as has
been previously discussed. See supra notes 269-80 and accompanying text.
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companied by a sufficiently high degree of integration of resources,
facilities, and risks of loss and opportunities for profit will escape per
se illegality. Likewise, those agreements which reduce transaction costs
so drastically as to practically create a "new product" through the
improvement of a market will also escape a finding of per se illegality." '
Thus, Justice Stevens may have recognized the impracticality of ap-
plying a per se characterization standard which declares every
restraint tampering with price competition to be illegal per se.92
291. Justice Stevens appeared to have adopted a per se characterization theory
in Maricopa County which was similar to Professor Sullivan's. The latter distinguishes
'naked" price restraints (which are always illegal per se) from arrangements
accompanying "partial integrations" and arrangements "making" (or improving) a market.
See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, SS 76, 77. Justice White noted that the copyright market
was improved by reducing transaction costs and creating integratio'ns (ASCAP and
BMI) which granted blanket licenses. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 20-22. Justice Powell
suggested that the maximum fee schedule in Maricopa County similarly reduced trans-
action costs. See Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2482 n.6. See also R. POSNER & F.
EASTERBROOK, supra note 136, at 14-15; Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. CHI.
L. REV. 886 (1981).
292. Such a broad per se standard does not inexorably follow from Socony-
Vacuum. For example, Justice White in Broadcast Music readily admitted that ASCAP's
and BMI's blanket licenses literally fixed prices and affected price competition. 441
U.S. at 19-20. However, the Court emphasized that an agreement which threatens the
proper operation of competitive markets must also be intended to obstruct free market
forces before it will be declared illegal per se. Id. Recognizing that the blanket license
did have an effect which threatened the operation of the free market economy, the
Court nonetheless upheld ASCAP's licensing practice because the purpose of that prac-
tice was not to restrict price competition. Id. at 19-21. Rather, the setting of the license's
price was ancillary to the creation of an integration (ASCAP) which resulted in more
efficient economic activity through lower transaction costs. Id.
The Court in Broadcast Music did, however, effectively alter the nature and scope
of the characterization process. The Court's per se characterization in Broadcast Music
differs greatly from the one advocated in Socony-Vacuum. In the former case, the Court
looked to the existence of economic efficiency-creating potential as a means of deter-
mining whether the contested agreement was designed to curb price competition. The
Court in Broadcast Music managed to avoid overruling Socony-Vacuum by using the
existence of substantial procompetitive efficiencies to prevent a finding that "the com-
bination [was] found for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing
• the price of a commodity." Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 213. In short, Justice White
in Broadcast Music used the "purpose" element of the Socony-Vacuum per se standard
as a means of limiting the latter decision and allowing him to declare that some price
fixes were not illegal per se. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 23.
However, Justice Stevens failed to emphasize this "purpose" limitation of Socony-
Vacuum's standard in formulating his own per se standard in Maricopa County. Not
surprisingly, his per se characterization standard was extremely broad: the Justice
forbade all price fixes and implied that any agreement tampering with price struc-
tures would be illegal per se. See Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2475-77. Similarly,
there was no mention of factors such as "ancillary restraints" and economic "efficiency-
creating potential" serving as justifications for agreements affecting price competition.
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Given these exceptions to the per se characterization standard
Justice Stevens formulated in Maricopa County, his use of a Rule of
Reason analysis to rebut many of the FMC's procompetitive justifica-
tions was not illogical or inappropriate. The Justice used a truncated
Rule of Reason analysis to determine whether the FMC's fee schedule
made possible a "unique" form of insurance coverage otherwise unat-
tainable, and whether the FMC's members' voting on these schedules
was necessary.29 Justice Stevens may have phrased his inquiry in
terms of whether a "unique" health care plan was established so that
he could, by rejecting that defense, further demonstrate that no "new
product" was created in Maricopa County. 4 Had Justice Stevens found
that the fee schedule created such procompetitive efficiencies as to
effectively create a "new product," and had these efficiencies resulted
from the integration of the foundation members' productive
resources," he presumably would have found the schedule to be legal
as a "necessary consequence ' '296 of creating a "unique" form of
insurance coverage.29 '
Unfortunately, there are several flaws in Justice Stevens' use
of a truncated Rule of Reason analysis. First, while it may be wise
to retain agreements which create procompetitive efficiencies through
293. Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2477-78.
294. The "new product" theory in reality involves not the creation of a "dif-
ferent" product but merely a reduction in transaction costs or other substantial effi-
ciency gains. See supra notes 269-80 and accompanying text. Therefore, Justice Stevens'
Rule of Reason analysis ultimately inquires into whether the fee schedule created any
substantial economic efficiencies otherwise unavailable.
Ironically, this inquiry is similar to the one advocated by Justice Powell in his
dissent. Justice Powell would introduce a per se standard requiring courts to deter-
mine whether the contested agreement created any substantial and otherwise pro-
competitive benefits. See Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2482-83. Justice Stevens used
a truncated Rule of Reason analysis to determine if the agreement provided consumers
with "a uniquely desirable form of insurance coverage that could not otherwise exist."
Id. at 2477.
295. Professor Liebeler postulates that the Maricopa FMC was an integration
of productive resources: the members jointly provided peer-group analysis (a major
justification for the existence of FMC's in the first place) and distributed insurance
proceeds. ANTITRUST ADVISOR, supra note 24, S1.29 at 18.
296. The Court in Broadcast Music held that the blanket license escaped per
se illegality because it was a "necessary consequence of the integration necessary to
achieve [economic] efficiencies." 441 U.S. at 21.
297. However, there is a good possibility, as noted in the text, that Justice
Stevens would have justified the schedule because it created a "new product." Justice
Powell, on the other hand, would have justified the agreement because it provided
substantial and otherwise unavailable procompetitive efficiencies. See supra note 291
and accompanying text.
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integration,29 such agreements simply do not fall within the Maricopa
County-Socony-Vacuum unconditional prohibition of all agreements
which tamper with price competition. While Justice Stevens may be
justified in making exceptions to this per se standard and using an
abbreviated Rule of Reason analysis to determine whether such
exceptions are applicable in a given case, this method of per se
characterization analysis confuses lawyers and jurists alike. The use
of a truncated Rule of Reason analysis also undermines the very
justifications given for applying such a broad rule, i.e., clarity and
consistency in analysis, and a reduction in the use of judicial
resources." 9 Justice Stevens should state his reasons for conducting
a truncated Rule of Reason analysis instead of requiring legal analysts
to use circuitous and often tortuous reasoning to rationally explain
inconsistencies and contradictions within Court opinions and between
Court cases."0 If- such a candid explanation would weaken Maricopa
County's broad per se standard (as it undoubtedly would), then that
standard should not be so broad and rigid in the first place.
Second, Justice Stevens' failure to articulate any criteria for
distinguishing between acceptable degrees of integration, such as part-
nerships and "other joint agreements,""0 ' and unacceptable degrees
of integration"' leaves the bar and judiciary without any workable
guidelines for determining which integrations should be declared illegal
per se and which should not be so declared."' Obviously, total integra-
tions are acceptable and not illegal per se. 4 Yet some partial integra-
298. There appears to be nearly universal agreement on this point, even among
antitrust antagonists. Compare R. BORK, supra note 4, at 279 (agreement not illegal per
se if it designed to create procompetitive efficiencies, is capable of doing so, and no
broader than necessary) with L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, S77 at 210 ("[Alutomatic
application of the per se rule comes to an end where significant, otherwise unattainable
integration benefits begin.").
299. Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2473, 2478.
300. Professor Sullivan's HANDBOOK ON ANTITRUST LAW attempts to spin a web
of consistency and logic in a hopelessly confusing and inconsistent body of case law.
See generally L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2. His recent attempt to harmonize the GTE
Sylvania, Professional Eng'rs and Broadcast Music opinions illustrates even better the
difficulties of attempting such a ormidible task. See Sullivan & Wiley, supra note 141,
322-36, 339-42.
301. Such as ASCAP and BMI.
302. Such as the Maricopa FMC. See Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2479-80.
303. See infra note 345 and accompanying text.
304. A "total" integration connotes a total integration of ownership, which is
a merger. Antitrust law has long allowed such mergers, subject to the requirements
of S7 of the Clayton Act. See generally L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, SS 192-216; R. POSNER
& F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 136, at 386-478.
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tions, °1 such as ASCAP and BMI, escape per se illegality while others,
such as the Maricopa FMC, do not. The Maricopa County majority
opinion offers little guidance as to the degree of integration required
to prevent a price-setting arrangement among competitors from
acquiring per se illegality.3
6
Third, while Justice Stevens' use of a truncated Rule of Reason
analysis in Maricopa County was not illogical given his exception to
Maricopa County's per se standard," ' his application of the Rule in
that case's particular factual setting is suspect. Justice Stevens bas-
ed his rejection of the foundation's fee schedule on questionable
presumptions. °8 Moreover, these presumptions were not made in favor
of the defendant, as one would have expected in a summary judg-
ment proceeding initiated by the plaintiff. 09
Fourth, the Justice erroneously rejected the FMC's argument
that its fee schedule created enormous procompetitive benefits and
saved consumers millions of dollars by allowing insurance companies
to underwrite insurance policies more efficiently. ' Although this
rejection would have been proper in the absence of exceptions to
Maricopa County's per se standard, these exceptions do exist.
Therefore, the Justice's rejection of this economic efficiency creating
potential was not justified. The establishment of a maximum fee
schedule presumably not only saved millions of dollars but also lowered
the high transaction costs in the health care industry thereby allow-
ing consumers to shop for quality medical services at lower prices."
The economic efficiencies created here are no different from those
305. Partial integrations are integrations which integrate some productive func-
tions, but leave other functions, such as manufacturing, to be carried on separately
by the participating firms. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, §77 at 207.
306. Perhaps the Court presently intends to conduct a case-by-case analysis
to determine whether a given combination exhibits a sufficient degree of integration
to escape per se characterization. One can only hope that the Court will not require
a degree of integration sufficient to effectively create a "new product." As previously
stated, the Court should immediately abandon use of this legal fiction because further
reliance on it will only serve to further confuse an already confusing and myopic area
of the law. See supra notes 269-80 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 288-97 and accompanying text.
308. See supra note 285.
309. Recall that the plaintiff in Maricopa County was requesting summary judg-
ment, and therefore the Court was called upon to favor the defendant's position when
making any inferences or giving any presumptions. See supra note 285.
310. See Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2477 & n.25, 2478.
311. Justice Powell referred to this reduction in transaction costs in several
places in his dissenting opinion in Maricopa County. See id. at 2482 n.6, 2485 n.13.
See also R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 136, at 14.
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present in Broadcast Music. In deference to Broadcast Music and the
doctrine of stare decisis, the Court should have affirmed the appellate
court decision.1
Finally, the majority in Maricopa County did not repudiate this
procompetitive agreement for lack of merit (for the Court could not
deny these efficiencies occurred given the case's procedural context),
but rather because participating doctors voted on the fee schedule
themselves."3 Justice Stevens reasoned that insurers stood to lose a
great deal if the foundation's members were allowed to set their own
fees14
Unfortunately, the majority's position is based on a notion of
"formalistic line drawing" that distinguishes prices set by competitors
from those prices established by a third party."' One obvious justifica-
tion for allowing the doctors to vote on the fee schedule is that it
was cheaper for the foundation to poll the doctors than for the seven
insurance companies underwriting the FMC-sponsored plan to conduct
the poll. 16 The insurer's approval of this supposedly threatening
arrangement further undermines Justice Stevens' position. 17
4. Justice Powell's dissent
The presence of a vigorous dissent in Maricopa County gives
the decision added significance.1 Justice Powell unequivocally adopted
312. Recall that the district court would have been able to declare the fee
schedule illegal per se at trial if the discovery process revealed that the procompetitive
efficiencies claimed by the Maricopa FMC did not actually exist. See supra notes 258-60
and accompanying text.
See Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2477-78.
Justice Stevens saw the foundation members' ability to set their own maximum
fees as providing them with enough bargaining power to more or less dictate their
terms to the insurers. Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2478 n.29.
See ANTITRUST ADVISOR, supra note 24, S1.29 at 22-23(Court's differentiation bet-
ween doctors fixing maximum fees as compared to insurers doing same reaches for-
malistic heights reminiscent of Schwinn). See also supra notes 269-80 and accompany-
ing text.
316. See R. POSNER & F. EASTERBOOK, supra note 136, at 14. The majority also
recognized that requiring the various insurance companies to establish the fee schedule
would be a more protracted (and therefore more costly) process. See Maricopa County,
102 S. Ct. at 2478 n.28 (requiring insurance companies rather than foundation to establish
maximum fees would be a somewhat "more protracted" process).
317. Justice Powell considered the insurance companies' approval of the fee-
setting procedure to be of great significance because he saw the insurers as the parties
representing consumer interests. See id. at 2481-82.
318. Id. at 2483-85.
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a "consumer welfare" view of antitrust law3 9 and demonstrated how
he would perform the per se characterization analysis in the case.
32
His dissent graphically illustrates the contrasting per se characteriza-
tion analyses advocated by the Chicago and Harvard Schools32' and
also suggests that Maricopa County has effectively overruled Broad-
cast Music
Justice Powell began by accusing the Court of ignoring the
benefits which the FMC-sponsored plan provided to consumers of
medical services322 The Justice stressed that Maricopa County's pro-
cedural context required the Court to assume that the FMC-sponsored
plan saved consumers millions of dollars.323 He derided the Court
throughout his dissent for its invalidation of a plan that presumably
benefited consumers enormously.324 Justice Powell flatly stated that
the Sherman Act was passed to benefit consumers and that the goal
of antitrust law is consumer welfare. 25 Given this goal, the Justice
considered the "short shrift""32 given to consumer benefits by the
majority to be both inconsistent with Broadcast Music and an improper
judicial resolution of the case.2
The dissent also contained an alternative to the per se
characterization standard offered by the majority. The majority's per
se standard, adopted from Socony-Vacuum, focused on whether the
contested agreement tampered with price structure and dismissed any
defenses based on competitive evils or procompetitive justifications.3 28
However, Justice Powell's per se standard focused on economic effi-
ciency potential as the primary factor to be considered in per se
analysis, thus reaffirming Broadcast Music's per se theory. Justice
Powell held that courts were to determine whether an arrangement's
319. Justice Powell stated: "[Tihe antitrust laws are a consumer welfare prescrip-
tion." Id. at 2485 (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone, 442 U.S. 330 (1979)).
At another point, the Justice described the Sherman Act as "a law designed
to benefit consumers." Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2481.
320. Id. at 2481-83. Given the uncertain future of Maricopa County (it is a 4
- 3 decision), Justice Powell's per se characterization analysis is of particular interest:
it may well become the Court's standard approach to price fixing cases in the future.
321. Compare R. BoRK, supra note 4, at 1-11, 262-79, with L. SULLIVAN, supra
note 2, SS 1, 2, 70, 72.
322. Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2480.
323. Id. at 2481.
324. Id. at 2481-82, 2484-85.
325. See supra note 319.
326. Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2480.
327. Id. at 2480, 2485.
328. Id. at 2474, 2477. See also supra notes 263-67 and accompanying text.
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purported procompetitive efficiencies were substantial and unattainable
in the absence of the agreement." He explained that such an
economically-oriented analysis was needed because the Court
previously recognized that "departure from the rule of reason stan-
dard should be based on demonstrable economic effect rather than
formalistic line drawing."330 Thus, the Justice once again revealed his
reluctance to apply the per se rule without examining an agreement's
purported procompetitive justification and benefit to consumers." This
approach stands in sharp contrast to Justice Stevens' exhortation that
courts were not to consider procompetitive efficiencies involving price
fixing agreements because all such agreements are flatly illegal per
se. 2 Presumably, Justice Powell, who in GTE Sylvania borrowed much
of Judge Bork's philosophy,333 also considers an inquiry into whether
an- agreement "literally" fixes prices or not to be irrelevant."4
Lastly, Justice Powell's burden of proof is noticeably higher than
that of Justice Stevens. As has been shown, a per se standard based
on efficiency creating potential effectively raises the antitrust plain-
tiffs burden of proof in justifying a conclusion of per se illegality.3 5
Justice Powell argued that Arizona (the plaintiff in Maricopa County)
did not meet its burden of proof in the case because the state failed
to show that the fee schedule was plainly anti-competitive and without
substantial and procompetitive efficiency justification. 36 One may
presume that Justice Powell will explicitly address this issue of respec-
tive evidentiary burdens in any future cases involving per se
characterization of an agreement purportedly fixing prices."'
329. Id. at 2482.
330. Id. (quoting GTE Sylvania, 433. U.S. at 58-59).
331. Id. at 2483. Justice Powell stated:"[Tlhe per se label should not be assigned
without carefully considering substantial benefits and procompetitive justifications." Id.
332. Id. at 2477. Significantly, several factors given by Justice Stevens as
reasons for prohibiting any restriction or tampering with price competition are ig-
nored by Justice Powell in his dissent. These factors are: 1) barriers to entry; 2) the
suprmeacy of free market price over individually-set price; 3) restrictions on the freedom
of individual competitors and 4) the possibility of maximum prices becoming minimum
prices. See id. at 2474-75.
333. See GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 55-56. See also text accompanying note 123.
334. See R. BORK, supra note 4, at 28. "We should encourage those explicit and
ancillary agreed-upon eliminations of rivalry that make the basic integration more
efficient." Id..
335. See supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
336. Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2485. The millions of dollars saved by con-
sumers because of the fee schedule effectively rebutted any such assertion.
337. Such a presumption is based upon the fact that Justice Powell also noted
a plaintiffs failure to meet his burden of proof under the increased-efficiency test
in GTE Sylvania. See GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 57-59.
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In summary, Justices Powell and Stevens differ in view as to
how a per se characterization approach should be conducted. Justice
Stevens, seeing antitrust law as designed to promote competition,33 8
considered all maximum price fixing agreements illegal because of their
tendency to raise barriers to market entry,339 to restrict individual
competitor freedom, 34 ° to substitute individual judgment for market
analysis, 4 ' and to possibly become minimum prices. 42 Once maximum
price fixes were so denounced, it was elementary that the Maricopa
FMC's fee schedule, which directly fixed maximum prices, would be
declared illegal per se. Justice Powell, on the other hand, would not
have condemned the schedule as illegal per se because he views anti-
trust laws as designed to benefit consumers 343 and the maximum-price
fixing at issue in Maricopa County presumably saved consumers
millions of dollars. Justice Powell would therefore deny plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment and allow the trial court to conduct
an economically-oriented per se characterization analysis. This analysis
would determine whether purported consumer benefits and other
allegedly procompetitive justifications actually resulted from the fee
schedule's setting of maximum prices.
3 44
VII. CONCLUSION
The most striking conclusion to be drawn from Maricopa County
is that the case does not eradicate the present confusion in "price
fixing" case law. For example, for all its theory and historical analysis,
Maricopa County does not make any constructive contribution to case
law concerning the proper method for characterizing various
agreements as "price fixes." Broadcast Music addressed this
characterization problem by finding that not all price fixes were illegal
and by holding that courts should characterize a given agreement as
a "per se price fix" only if it restricted output and competition.
338. See Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 687-88 (Congress expected to delineate
Sherman Act boundaries through common law: case precedent was a Rule of Reason,
which focused on retraint's impact on competition).
Justice Stevens' sympathy for antitrust goals such as removal of barriers to
entry, decentralization of economic power, and the right of all businessmen to make
their own economic decisions suggests that he is sympathetic to Harvard School analysis
and theory. See supra note 4.
339. Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2475. 113
340. Id. at 2474 (quoting Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951)).
341. Id. at 2474-75 (quoting Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968)).
342. Id.
343. See supra note 319 and accompanying text.
344. Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2485 n.13.
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Agreements which increased, or potentially increased, economic effi-
ciency escaped an "illegal per se" characterization. The majority in
Maricopa County, however, did not reiterate this statement, even
though the case's factual situation closely resembled that found in
Broadcast Music and thus provided an opportunity for reaffirmance
of the latter case. Instead, the Court flatly declared all maximum and
minimum "price fixes" to be illegal per se.
Maricopa County's extension of the per se price fixing rule to
all agreements which tamper with price was easy to apply in that
case because the contested agreement was a naked price fix. Since
Maricopa County involved direct maximum price fixing in a horizon-
tal market, the Court's major task was to extend its prohibition on
vertical maximum price restraints to horizontal market structures.
Once this task was completed, the characterization of the fee schedules
as per se price fixing was a fait accompli. The Court in effect merely
characterized the "literal" price fix as a "per se price fix."
However, by distinguishing Broadcast Music rather than over-
ruling it, Justice Stevens left unanswered the question of how a court
should characterize an agreement which indirectly affects prices yet
provides substantial economic efficiencies. If all such agreements are
illegal per se, then Justice Stevens fails to provide a characterization
standard which can distinguish between the arrangements in Broad-
cast Music and Maricopa County.45 In short, Maricopa County merely
states that direct maximum "price fixes" are illegal per se and fails
to instruct courts as to when and how restraints on price competition
should be characterized as "literal," rather than "per se", price fixes.
The case may thus become more significant for its extension of
Albrecht v. Herald Co.346 into the field of horizontal restraints than
for any characterization standard it purports to employ.347
The majority's use of two apparently conflicting per se price
fixing standards and the now-uncertain status of Broadcast Music make
any pronouncement on Maricopa County's ultimate significance
premature. The case's parameters will be set by future Court deci-
345. Justice Powell recognized this failure to establish an effective per se stan-
dard: "One would have expected [the Court] to acknowledge that per se characteriza-
tion is inappropriate if the challenged agreement or plan achieves . . . procompetitive
benefits that otherwise are not available. The Court does not do this. And neither
does it provide alternative criteria by which the per se characterization is to be deter-
mined." Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2483-84.
346. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
347. See supra note 256. See also supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
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sions - antitrust is no different from other areas of the law in this
regard.
Maricopa County does, however, provide valuable insight into
the Court's approach to per se characterization. The decision reveals
the existence of deep dissention within the Court regarding the
characterization process itself. Indeed, a comparison of Maricopa
County's two opinions suggests that at present there exists two con-
flicting approaches to per se characterization, with each enjoying con-
siderable support from a substantial portion of the Court. Moreover,
the use of two inconsistent per se standards in the majority's opinion
implies that there is uncertainty within at least one faction of the
Court regarding the precise nature and scope of the per se
characterization process in price fixing cases.
Maricopa County's legacy may well be that it is a microcosm
of antitrust's more serious concerns, containing within it the confu-
sion, inconsistency and disagreement found throughout the case law
and legal literature in this area. This note has illustrated that the
current crisis in antitrust arises from fundamentally incompatible
perceptions of antitrust's goals and purpose: Maricopa County's
majority opinion representing Harvard School theory, (i.e., "competi-
tion" as the sole standard) and the case's dissent advocating the
Chicago School's position on per se characterization and antitrust policy
in general (i.e., consumer welfare as standard).
Unfortunately, we all pay for the ideological struggle the Court
finds itself presently engaged in. The Court's issuance of two con-
tradictory decisions within a three year period - Broadcast Music
and Maricopa County - guarantees that confusion and uncertainty
will remain in per se characterization analysis no matter which theory
is ultimately accepted in any individual case. Ironically, the per se
rule, intended to provide certainty and judicial economy, has injected
more uncertainty into the law. Judicial resources are also depleted
as appellate courts and the Supreme Court are forced to interpret
and distinguish cases like Broadcast Music and Maricopa County in
vain attempts to clarify the per se characterization process. As long
as the Court remains equally divided in its ideological approach to
antitrust law, and as long as internally inconsistent opinions such as
Maricopa County are issued, the current confusion in per se analysis
will not subside.
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